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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to determine whether 
congressional campaign budgeting decisions influence electoral 
success. Special emphasis was paid to spending levels for opinion 
polling and media over time for successful and unsuccessful 
congressional candidates.
Our analysis compared the fundraising and spending patterns 
over time of congressional elections predicted to be close. The 
research sample included campaigns from both 1982 and 1984 
election years to account for the possible impact of having a 
presidential election during one of the congressional elections.
To avoid the influence of incumbancy, all of the candidates in our 
sample were running for their first terms.
The 1984 data clearly reflected the impact of having a 
popular presidential candidate running for reelection. Fewer 
elections were considered competitive and therefore fewer 
campaigns qualified for our data sample. Furthermore, the 
congressional candidates from the president's party won election 
in every case. The 1982 elections, on the other hand, provided 
more close races for our sample and the number of successful 
campaigns were evenly split between the Democrats and Republicans.
It was found that there is very little difference between the 
overall spending patterns of successful and unsuccessful 
campaigns. On average, spending tends to reflect fundraising in 
that nearly half of all expenditures are spent during the final 
quarter of the election year. Successful candidates differ by 
having, on average, more funds in their total budgets.
The one exceptional difference in budgeting involves the use 
of opinion polling. Although successful candidates tend to 
outspend their competition in every area, the difference is more 
dramatic in the area of opinion polling. It is recommended that 
the significance of this finding by explored by further research.
Advertising expenditures are, on average, the single largest 
budget item for all candidates. Most advertising funds were spent 
on radio and television followed by direct mail and printing.
When compared to past research, it was found that all 
congressional campaigns spent a larger percentage of their budgets 
on radio and television advertising than past campaigns, 
suggesting an increase in the level of professionalization at the 
congressional campaign level.
It was concluded that external factors, such as the 
reelection of a presidential candidate, have a significant impact 
on congressional election outcomes. Consequently, some candidates 
are not successful because external factors do not permit them to 
raise the necessary funds to run competitive campaigns. Because 
successful and unsuccessful congressional campaigns tend to budget 
their funds similarly, the amount of funds raised is more 
sugnificant than spending patterns in determining congressional 
election outcomes.
SPENDING PATTERNS IN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS 
1982 AND 1984
INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this paper is that money is indeed important 
for electoral success in congressional campaigns. This point is 
demonstrated by the ever increasing costs associated with 
campaigning in each new election. In conjunction with rising 
campaign costs, we have seen the traditional party structures, 
used in the past to elect candidates, give way to a corps of 
professional campaign consultants, mass media campaigning, and 
sophisticated campaign technologies —  a growing industry 
requiring significant infusions of cash.
Clearly, money alone does not insure victory at the polls, 
but rather, the lack of sufficient funding or the ineffective use 
of campaign funds prohibits the electability of some congressional 
candidates. Funding is one of many resources needed by successful 
candidates, but it is a very powerful one. Without sufficient 
amounts of money, political campaigns may not be able to do all of 
the things necessary to position their candidates for victory.
For challengers lacking name recognition, money is the crucial 
resource that makes it possible for them to compete effectively 
with their better known opponents.
The arguments presented here bear strong implications for our 
system of representative democracy. Certainly the most intriguing 
question deals with whether campaign contributors have better 
access to congressmen or an enhanced position in lobbying for 
friendly legislation than non-contributing constituents. Another 
question concerns the role of contributors from outside the 
district: Should these individuals benefit from representation by 
a congressman for whom they cannot vote? This situation clearly 
conflicts with the underlying intention in the Constitution for 
using single-member districts to elect the House membership. 
Finally, because groups can raise larger campaign contributions 
than most individuals, do their members gain more access to 
congressmen as a result of their organization's substantial 
donations? The list of implications is limitless and beyond the 
scope of this study.
This paper will focus on campaign spending patterns by 
contenders in congressional races. The purpose here is to 
determine how budgeting decisions have an impact on getting 
elected to Congress. Special attention will be paid to campaign 
spending for opinion polling and advertising. The intention here 
is to provide a base for future research that would lead to 
further refinement of current campaign management practices in the 
budgeting area and thereby improve the competitiveness of 
congressional elections.
The first chapter will review the field of literature, 
emphasizing studies of the general trends in congressional
elections. Specifically, this chapter will look at the election 
studies inquiring into the impact of incumbency and the "surge and 
decline" effect of presidential elections on congressional 
elections. The second chapter will provide an overview of current 
campaign technologies, how they are used in a modern political 
campaign, and how much they cost. The third chapter will focus on 
studies of the role of money in congressional elections. This 
chapter will begin with an overview of general spending patterns 
in elections followed by a discussion of spending patterns within 
campaign structures. Special attention will be paid to a study by 
Goldenberg and Traugott inquiring into the internal budgetary 
patterns of congressional campaigns. The fourth chapter will 
discuss the research methodology and present the findings. This 
chapter will examine a group of competitive congressional races 
from the 1982 and 1984 elections. The financial information on 
these races will be taken from the reports they submitted to the 
Federal Election Commission. The findings will demonstrate how 
these campaigns budget their funds over time. Finally, the 
conclusions of this thesis will be presented in the in the fifth 
chapter.
CHAPTER I
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
Before beginning an analysis of money in politics we will 
examine congressional elections in their broader terms looking at 
the various aspects of races scholars believe have an impact on 
election outcome. All candidates do not enter the political arena 
under the same circumstances. Candidates differ in their party 
affiliation, professional background, political experience, 
philosophy, and level of talent. Candidates sometimes win or lose 
due to circumstances beyond their control or the control of their 
opponents. In this chapter we will review the features of 
elections —  other than campaign spending —  which determine who 
will serve in Congress. We will look specifically at the impact 
of incumbency, party affiliation, presidential coattails, and 
fluctuations in the economy, factors that have received 
considerable attention by scholars as explanatory variables in 
congressional election outcome. After examining these factors, we 
will have a framework for weighing the relative importance of 
campaign spending on election outcome.
THE ROLE OF INCUMBENCY
Most scholars agree that elections for the U. S. House of
Representatives are not very competitive. The oft-cited measure
used to describe this phenomena is the high reelection rates of
incumbent congressmen. In the period from 1946 to the present,
incumbents seeking reelection have won better than 79.3 percent of
the time and in many election years, better than 90 percent.^-
Table 1-1 lists incumbent reelection rates from 1946 through 1982
as provided by a study by Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein.
In 1986, a record 98.4 percent of the incumbents running for
2
reelection returned to Congress. The overwhelming advantage
incumbents have in getting reelected to the House of
Representatives is by far the most preponderant and most studied
aspect of congressional elections.
Mayhew observed this phenomena by looking at the declining
3
number of marginal congressional districts in the country.
Marginal (or competitive) House districts are defined as districts
where the incumbent won in the last election with not more than a
4
55 percent share of the vote. As Table 1-2 demonstrates, the 
number of marginal seats has steadily declined since 1956 
suggesting that fewer districts have seen competitive races in 
recent years. Mayhew's point is that incumbents not only win more 
often than challengers, but —  on average —  they win by 
increasingly larger margins as well.
TABLE 1-1
HOUSE INCUMBENTS REELECTED, 1946 - 1980
Percentage of Incumbents 
Number of Incumbents Seeking Reelection
Year Seeking Reelection Who Won
1946 328 82.4
1948 317 79.3
1950 362 90.5
1952 354 91.0
1954 379 93.1
1956 389 94.6
1958 356 89.9
1960 375 92.6
1962 368 91.5
1964 344 86.6
1966 362 88.1
1968 396 96.8
1970 379 94.5
1972 365 93.6
1974 343 87.7
1976 368 95.8
1978 358 93.7
1980 361 90.7
1982 432 90.1
SOURCE: The American Elections of 1982, e d ., Thomas E . Mann and
Norman J. Ornstein, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 
1983), p. 164-165.
TABLE 1-2
DECLINE OF MARGINAL HOUSE RACES 1956-1980
Year
Number of 
Incumbents Running 
General Election
Percentage of 
Incumbents 
Reelected with at 
Least 60 Percent of 
the Major Party Vote
1956 403 59.1
1958 390 63.1
1960 400 58.9
1962 376 63.6
1964 388 58.5
1966 401 67.7
1968 397 72.2
1970 389 77.3
1972 373 77.8
1974 383 66.4
1976 381 71.9
1978 377 78.0
1980 392 72.9
ERAGE 68.3
SOURCE: Vital Statistics on Congress, 1982, ed., Norman J.
Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, Michael J. Malbin and John F. Bibby 
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1982), p. 50.
The advantage of incumbency is by no means unique to 
candidates running for the House. By using linear and multiple 
regression techniques to analyze election returns for the U.S. 
Senate, Kostroski found that over a twelve year period, incumbent 
Senators became two percent safer with each new election.^ When 
compared to party strength indices, Kostroski concluded that 
incumbency has become more important in determining election 
outcome than candidate party. Furthermore, he found that in only 
a few states where strong party competition remains, are there 
instances where Senate incumbency rates remain low.
Cover and Mayhew have been able to measure what the
incumbency advantage means in real votes by examining two key
£
election campaigns during an incumbent's political career. In 
the first instance, when an incumbent is running for reelection 
for the first time, he is expected to do better than when running 
as a challenger. In fact, an increase in votes (from 1.6 to 7.5 
percent) is regularly observed and is often referred to as the 
"sophomore surge." In the second instance, Cover and Mayhew 
examine what happens to an incumbent's successor nominee after the 
incumbent chooses to retire. As expected, the successor usually 
does not do as well. This observed reduction in vote, referred to 
as the "retirement slump," varies from 1.4 to 11.0 percent and 
provides a very real measurement of the value of incumbency.
Table 1-3 depicts both measurements from 1962 through 1978.
As a long-time observer of Congress and the incumbency 
advantage, Mayhew developed a behavioral model describing many of
TABLE 1-3
SOPHOMORE SURGE AND RETIREMENT SLUMP FOR HOUSE MEMBERS
1962 - 1978
Year
Mean Sophomore 
Surge (Adjusted) N
Mean Retirement 
Slump (Adjusted) N
1962 +2.1% 46 -1.4% 17
1964 + 1.6 54 -1.4 25
1966 +3.3 69 -4.7 13
1968 +6 • 5 54 -7.6 19
1970 +6.7 31 -6.6 36
1972 +7.5 43 -11.0 27
1974 +5.8 57 -6.7 44
1976 +6.8 87 -6.0 41
1978 +7.2 51 -8.9 42
SOURCE: Albert D. Cover and David R. Mayhew, "Congressional 
Dynamics and the Decline of Competitive Congressional Elections," 
in Congress Reconsidered, Second Edition, ed, Lawrence C. Dodd and 
Bruce I, Oppenheimer (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 
1981), p. 70.
the activities incumbents undertake to improve their electoral 
chances both while in Washington and in their home districts. 
Congressmen, he believes, are best described as "single-minded 
seekers of r e e l e c t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the institution of 
Congress, Mayhew argues, is designed remarkably well for meeting 
the electoral requirements of its members. Because the 
satisfaction of electoral needs is not viewed by members as a 
zero-sum situation, we have seen a growth over the years in the 
number of institutional support systems that assist incumbents in 
their reelection efforts including: larger congressional staffs, 
more franked mailing privileges, and larger travel budgets for
g
trips back to the home district. Because these services are also 
performed by election campaigns, they can be used to displace some 
of the costs of campaigning. As a result, potential challengers 
who cannot meet this initial cost of entry into the political 
arena are eliminated from serious competition or choose not to 
run.
Obviously, congressmen have other goals than reelection, but 
by focusing on this particular aspect of Congress, Mayhew created 
a framework for further study. His view is a clear departure from 
the direction taken by much of the research until that time which 
employed party models to describe electoral patterns in the United 
States. Mayhew points out that the old party politics approach to 
analyzing elections more aptly describes the style of campaigning 
used in Europe, rather than in the U.S. House where party 
structures are relatively weak. Consequently, the significance of
this new viewpoint is two-fold: first, the spotlight is put on the 
person running for office rather than the party and second, the 
model tends to explain incumbent reelection rates rather well.
Building on Mayhew's model of incumbent behavior and the
institutionalization of reelection structures, other theories have
been proposed to explain the incumbency effect. Tufte argues that
because incumbents are able to help set the boundaries of
congressional districts through redistricting, they use this power
9
to fortify their own electoral chances. Tufte's attempt to 
demonstrate a causal relationship between incumbency and 
electability is weak at best since state legislatures and the 
federal courts also play significant roles in the redistricting 
process. Furthermore, Ferejohn found the decline in congressional 
competition is not specific to redrawn districts, rather this 
phenomena has taken place evenly across district boundaries.^ 
Therefore, Tufte's emphasis on redistricting explains how the 
incumbency effect works in only a very few cases.
The line of inquiry followed by most scholars emphasizes the 
electoral advantages associated with simply holding office. 
Abramowitz tests two competing hypotheses explaining why voters 
react favorably to incumbent congressmen.^ The first hypothesis, 
called the familiarity hypothesis, states simply that voters 
prefer incumbents because they are more likely to know an 
incumbent's name than the name of a challenger. This viewpoint 
suggests that in low-stimulus elections, such as midterm 
congressional races, any information at all predisposes voters
toward a candidate. The second hypothesis, called the reputation 
hypothesis, states that voter satisfaction with an incumbent's 
past performance, rather than simple name identification, 
determines how much value a congressman derives from incumbency. 
Abramowitz uses survey research to test these arguments and finds 
that the reputation hypothesis better reflects reality.
Visibility, he points out, is necessary for a congressman to 
establish a reputation, but visibility alone does not insure 
popularity. Abramowitz concludes that "a congressman must 
cultivate his constituency to turn incumbency into an 
advantage."^
In a related study, Fiorina examines several cases where
congressmen were able to cultivate their constituencies and
strengthen their electoral chances by using the advantages of
larger congressional staffs and by spending more time in the home
13
district than their predecessors. This phenomena, Fiorina
argues, has taken place in conjunction with the growth of the
federal bureaucracy. With more federal programs being implemented
in the hinterlands, congressmen have been willing to take the role
of an administrator or ombudsman of these operations in their home
districts. By doing this, they are both advertising themselves
and taking credit for these programs. Fiorina suggests that the
current breed of congressman often takes the view that it is
"better to be reelected as an errand boy than not be reelected at 
14
all." In a follow-up study, Fenno found support for Fiorina's 
analysis concluding that levels of congressional activity (work
habits, travel, etc.) are affected by the way congressmen perceive 
their constituencies and their own vulnerabilities.^
Borrowing from consumer research studies, Parker examines how 
the institutional support provided to incumbents is used to 
transform specific voter b e h a v i o r . A f t e r  polling voters from 
1964 through 1976, Parker found that unlike contests for president 
or U.S. Senate, congressional races tend to be "low information" 
contests. Few voters (from 18.8 to 43.9 percent) pay "a good deal 
of attention" to the activities of Congress. Because voter 
interest in congressional races tends to be low, Parker argues 
that voters are willing to rely on "subsidized" information 
sources such as congressional franked mail, rather than newspaper 
reports. Although this information is inherently biased, Parker 
points out that voters readily make this compromise because the 
perceived costs associated with making an incorrect voting 
decision in a congressional race are insignificant.
The chief implication of Parker^s research is that 
congressmen have a great deal of control over their electoral 
success because of their high level of control over the 
dissemination of information regarding themselves and their 
elections. Parker concludes that the „electoral advantage of 
incumbents is a function of their ability to "focus constituent 
attention on aspects of their job performance, or characteristics 
related to job performance, that produces favorable impressions of 
their overall performance."^ Conversely, the ability of 
challengers to win in congressional elections may be a function of
their ability to increase public awareness of their candidacy or 
to publicize their opponent's failures.
Building on this belief that congressmen exert substantial
influence on voter perceptions, Payne and later Yiannakis explore
how communication style varies with incumbent electability. Using
a case study approach, Payne examines how congressional behavior
18
has changed since the elections of 1936. Payne concludes that 
the current generation of congressmen, who are successful in 
building a personal electoral base, tend to be ambitious, 
publicity oriented types whereas many of their counterparts a 
generation earlier tended to shy away from such activities.
Whether this phenomena has come about because of the rise of mass 
media, Payne is not willing to speculate.
In a more recent study, Yiannakis argues that communication
19
style tends to vary with the type of district being represented. 
Yiannakis uses a content analysis approach looking at the 
newsletters and press releases sent by congressmen to their home 
districts. Borrowing her classification scheme from Mayhew, 
Yiannakis notes a tendency among "city machine" representatives to 
adopt a credit claiming style while congressmen from upper middle 
class, suburban districts use a nationally oriented, 
position-taking style. In either case, the congressman's 
communication style reflects his perception of his constituents' 
needs. Yiannakis explains that in the poorer urban districts, 
congressmen are reelected on their ability to bring home their 
share of federal programs and when this occurs, the congressmen of
these districts will advertise their role in providing these 
services. Yiannakis assumes that the constituents of upper middle 
class districts, on the other hand, are repelled by the concept of 
material gain from political involvement. Congressmen from these 
districts will attempt to depict themselves as statesmen by taking 
positions on a wide range of political issues, rather than 
emphasizing their involvement in pork-barrel politics. In either 
case, the incumbent congressman attempts to focus his message —  
as Parker discussed earlier —  on the aspects of his performance 
that produces favorable impressions of his overall performance.
The significance of Yiannakis' findings is that it demonstrates 
how well incumbents can adapt and alter their communication style 
to cultivate future votes and fortify their probability of 
reelection.
SURGE AND DECLINE: THE EFFECTS OF PARTY,
PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS, AND THE ECONOMY
Although incumbency is by far the most studied aspect of
congressional elections, it is by no means the exclusive
determinant of election outcome. Party, presidential coattails, 
and the state of the economy are factors affecting congressional 
elections that have received considerable attention. Because 
these three variables are closely related, they are examined here 
together. The linkage between party and presidential coattails is 
readily seen. Because a presidential candidate is considered the
leader of his party, his personal electoral success may affect the
chances of the congressional and senatorial candidates running
under his party banner. The linkage between the president/party 
factors and the state of the economy, on the other hand, is less 
obvious stemming from the common perception among voters that 
economic fluctuations are a function of presidential policy. 
Voters, it is argued, may reward or punish an incumbent president 
and the other candidates in his party depending on how well his 
particular economic programs are working. Much research —  
usually taking the form of aggregate election studies —  has been 
devoted to determining whether these logical arguments reflect 
reality.
As expected, a relationship exists between presidential and
congressional election outcomes. Successful presidential
candidates tend to bring a few congressional candidates —  usually
from marginal districts —  into office with them suggesting that
20
some party-line voting does take place. A more intriguing
aspect of this relationship, however, is that the president's
party nearly always loses congressional seats during the
subsequent midterm elections. Because these two phenomena have
become normal aspects of congressional elections, one scholar was
prompted to refer to them jointly as the "surge and decline"
21
effect. The following discussion examines the research 
inquiring into this phenomena beginning with the "surge" aspect of 
congressional elections.
Presidential Elections and Congressional Surge
The surge aspect of congressional elections has been long
examined by scholars. Although, the term "surge" appropriately
describes how the winning presidential candidate brings a surge of
new congressmen to office, it also accurately depicts what happens
to voter turnout in these election years. Table 1-4 describes
voter turnout for federal elections from 1930 to 1980 showing high
voter participation levels for presidential elections. On
average, voter turnout for presidential elections exceeds turnout
for midterm congressional races by better than ten percent.
Furthermore, a fall-off is seen between turnout in presidential
and congressional races held during the same year. This phenomena
has two implications. First, because voters are most interested
in voting for president, the strength of a party's presidential
candidate may have a significant effect on congressional
elections. Second, because the presidential elections attract
many new voters, the constitution of the congressional electorate
22
changes significantly with each new election. Successful 
congressional candidates, therefore, must be able to read and 
react to these changes in a manner that will position them for 
victory.
Although the data in Table 1-4 suggests a surge in overall
turnout, Key found that turnout surges take an assymetrical form
where strong increases in vote for one party are seldom met by
23
reciprocal surges for the other party. Key s observation
TABLE 1-4
TURNOUT IN PRESIDENTIAL AND HOUSE ELECTIONS, 1930 - 1980 
(Percentage of Voting Age Population)
Presidential House
Year Elections Elections
1930 — 33.7
1932 52.4 49.7
1934 — 41.4
1936 56.9 53.5
1938 — 44.0
1940 58.9 55.4
1942 — 32.5
1944 56.0 52.7
1946 — 37.1
1948 51.1 48.1
1950 — 41.1
1952 61.6 57.6
1954 — 41.7
1956 59.3 55.9
1958 — 43.0
1960 62.6 58.5
1962 — 45.4
1964 61.9 57.8
1966 — 45.4
1968 60.9 55.1
1970 — 43.5
1972 55.4 50.9
1974 — 36.1
1976 54.4 49.5
1978 — 35.1
1980 53.4 48.1
AVERAGE 57.3 46.6
SOURCE: Vital Statistics on Congress, 1982, ed., Norman J.
Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, Michael J. Malbin and John F. Bibby 
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1982), p. 37.
supports the implications mentioned above that election year and
the strength of presidential candidates are very important factors
affecting congressional election outcome. Key offers the
following explanation:
The simultaneous election of the President and of all 
House members enables the electorate to place control 
of these two organs of government in one or the other 
of the major parties. Furthermore, it permits, 
although it does not assure, a maximum unification of 
party campaign effort behind both presidential and 
congressional candidates and subjects more races for 
Representative to th^influences that play upon 
presidential voting.
Key, however, is quick to point out that coattails and party
voting do not explain electoral success in every case. During the
1940's and 1950's, as many as 100 southern congressional districts
were safe for the Democrats. Key suggests that districts where
the vote is normally very close (marginal seats) are most apt to
25
swing from party to party with the presidential vote.
Since Key, several studies have been introduced explaining
the significance of presidential elections on congressional races.
Most of the recent research has emphasized how presidential
coattails have become less significant or nonexistent as a factor
influencing congressional election outcomes. One such study by
Edwards, examines the relationship between how well a president
runs in a congressional district as compared to the success of his
26
party's congressional candidate. By looking at election data 
for six presidential races, Edwards found increasing instances 
where congressional candidates ran ahead of their party's 
successful presidential candidate. These findings are supported
by the fact that voters are exercising their option of 
split-ticket voting more often than in the past. Table 1-5 shows 
that the number of districts carried by the presidential candidate 
of one party and a congressional candidate of another party has 
steadily increased since 1900. Edwards concludes that the 
coattails effect is less important to congressional election 
outcomes probably because congressional incumbency has come to 
mean much more for voters.
In a related study, Kritzer and Eubank examine how incumbency
factors and the declining role of coattails affect the performance
27
of specific parties in congressional elections. Until very 
recently, they argue, winning the presidency usually meant winning 
a majority of seats in the House of Representatives as well. The 
Republican Party, however, has won several presidencies in recent 
years, but failed for the most part to win a majority in the 
House. Kritzer and Eubank polled voters to determine why this 
trend is taking place. They found that with each national 
electoral swing, each party suffers a similar dropout rate from 
presidential voters identified as party loyalists when the 
national trend is against them. The "recapture" rate, however, 
among Democrats deserting the Democratic presidential candidate, 
is higher than among Republican deserters. Kritzer and Eubank 
found that of the Democratic voters deserting the presidential 
candidate, 58.9 percent voted for the Democratic congressional 
candidate. Only 40.9 percent of the Republican voters who 
deserted the Republican presidential candidate returned to vote
TABLE 1-5
TICKET SPLITTING BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL AND HOUSE CANDIDATES,
1900 - 1980
Districts with Split Results
 ^      _ -
Year Districts Number Percentage
1900 295 10 3.4
1904 310 5 1.6
1908 314 21 6.7
1912 333 84 25.2
1916 333 35 10.5
1920 344 11 3.2
1924 356 42 11.8
1928 359 68 18.9
1932 355 50 14.1
1936 361 51 14.1
1940 362 53 14.6
1944 367 41 11.2
1948 422 90 21.3
1952 435 84 19.3
1956 435 130 29.9
1960 437 114 26.1
1964 435 145 33.3
1968 435 139 32.0
1972 435 192 44.1
1976 435 124 28.5
1980 435 143 32.8
SOURCE: Albert D. Cover and David R. Mayhew, "Congressional 
Dynamics and the Decline of Competitive Congressional Elections," 
in Congress Reconsidered, Second Edition, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and 
Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 
1981), p. 53.
a. Complete data on every congressional district not available 
before 1952.
b. Congressional districts carried by a congressional candidate 
of one party and a presidential candidate of another party.
for the Republican congressional candidate. Whether this 
phenomenon takes place because more current incumbents are 
Democrats and incumbency has become a more significant cue for 
voters in recent years, they were not willing to say. Kritzer and 
Eubank concluded, however, that party identification among voters 
has a subtle impact on congressional election outcomes favoring 
Democratic candidates.
Midterm Decline
It was mentioned that midterm congressional races are 
characterized by the term "decline." Like the surge aspect of 
presidential elections, the "decline" characteristics of midterm 
congressional elections are reflected by a decline in voter 
turnout but more importantly, by a decline in the number of seats 
represented by the President's party. Table 1-6 presents the 
losses by the President's party in midterm elections from 1862 to 
1982. On average, the President loses 36 congressional seats with 
each midterm election. This systematic pattern of American voting 
has given rise to a lively discussion among political scientists.
The initial theory used by scholars to explain midterm 
election patterns, commonly referred to as the "responsible 
parties" model of government, states simply that because 
presidential coattails are not present in midterm elections, the 
public is able to pass judgement on the legislative record of the 
parties when they vote for Congress. This view has come under
TABLE 1-6
LOSSES BY PRESIDENT'S PARTY IN MIDTERM ELECTIONS, 1861 - 1982
Party President's Party
Holding Gain/Loss of
Year Presidency Seats in House
1862 R -3
1866 R -2
1870 R -31
1874 R -96
1878 R -9
1882 R -33
1886 D -12
1890 R -85
1894 D -116
1898 R -21
1902 R 9
1906 R -28
1910 R -57
1914 D -59
1918 D -19
1922 R -75
1926 R -10
1930 R -49
1934 D 9
1938 D -71
1942 D -55
1946 D -55
1950 D -29
1954 R -18
1958 R -48
1962 D -4
1966 D -47
1970 R -12
1974 R -48
1978 D -15
1982 R -26
AVERAGE -36
SOURCE: The American Elections of 1982, ed*, Thomas E. Mann and
Norman J. Ornstein, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 
1983), p. 154.
a. Although the Republicans gained nine seats, they actually lost 
ground to the Democrats who gained 25 seats after the increase in 
the overall number of representatives from the 1900 census.
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attack most notably by Stokes and Miller. They argue that 
unlike the cohesive parties of European countries where the 
responsible parties approach explains electoral patterns fairly 
well, American party cohesion is eroded by a "cacophony of blocs
and individuals fulfilling their own definitions of the public
29
good." In support of their argument, Stokes and Miller found, 
after polling voters, that the public's awareness of the 
legislative record of each party is minimal. Consequently, the 
responsible parties model explains very little about American 
elections•
The view long held by politicians and journalists —  and 
until recently, ignored by many political scientists —  focuses 
attention on the performance of the President as the leader of his 
party. In this revision of the responsible parties model, midterm 
elections are considered referenda on the performance of the 
President and especially on his economic programs. Tufte points 
out that the economy during midterm election years is almost
always in worse condition than during presidential election
30
years. A consequence of this fact is that the President nearly 
always loses congressional seats because the voters are voicing 
their disapproval. In his study, Tufte compares aggregate 
election data with economic data and Gallup Approval Ratings to 
inquire into the relationship between the economy, voter approval 
of the President and midterm election outcomes. Tufte found a 
strong relationship between these three factors with the approval 
indices and aggregate election outcomes showing the strongest
congruency. In fact, Tufte argues, a 10 percent change in the
Gallup Approval Ratings will reflect a 1.3 percent change in the
aggregate midterm vote for the President's party in the House.
Unfortunately, Tufte's results do not indicate how this
relationship translates into changes in actual House seats.
Since Tufte, several attempts have been made to use
econometric methods to measure the impact of short-term economic
fluctuations on the gains and losses of the President's party in
the House. Kramer uses multiple regression techniques to examine
the impact of several economic factors as well as incumbency and
31
coattail effects for elections from 1896 through 1964. In doing
so, he attempts to pull together most of the previous research
dealing with only one of these factors. He concludes that
economic fluctuations have an impact on congressional elections,
that economic upturns benefit candidates of the incumbent
President's party and that downturns help the opposition.
Furthermore, election outcomes, he concludes, are in substantial
part responsive to objective economic changes occurring under the
incumbent party. Specifically, Kramer found that a 10 percent
decrease in per capita income would cost the incumbent
administration 4 to 5 percent of the aggregate congressional vote.
Real income, he found, is the most important factor because with
real income held constant, changes in unemployment or in inflation
have no significant independent effects on voting as scholars had
32
earlier believed.
After examining similar data from 1896 through 1970, Bloom
and Price modified Kramer's initial model concluding that the
impact of economic factors is actually assymmetrical with respect
33
to aggregate election outcomes for the House. Although economic 
downturns indeed have a pronounced effect on the vote for the 
President's party, they found no corresponding effect for economic 
upturns. These findings, they point out, are true regardless of 
party and over a broad range of economic conditions. Furthermore, 
they found a lagging effect in the data where voters tend to 
consider the state of the economy from the preceeding year, rather 
than economic conditions occurring during the midterm election 
year.
Although these two studies explain how economic policy may
affect aggregate national voting patterns, they do not tell us
anything about how economic factors affect individual seats. A
34
recent study by Owens and Olson attempts to do just that. Owens 
and Olson examine data on 429 congressional elections from 1972 
through 1976 in states where good party data is available. They 
failed to prove at this level, however, whether voters either 
reward or punish the party in power due to their economic 
policies. Owens and Olson concluded that in this microeconomic 
context, the answer may lie in voter's perceptions of their own 
economic situation, rather than in their actual economic 
condition.
Mann also attempts to rationalize the difference between 
aggregate election patterns and election outcomes in individual
28.
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congressional districts. Taking the view that party and 
national tides are woefully inadequate for explaining voters' 
choices, Mann opts to poll voters' impressions of candidates on a 
district by district basis. He found that larger numbers of 
voters have impressions of the candidates than previous research 
had indicated and that these impressions reflected the dialogue of 
the campaigns. Furthermore, he found candidate preference 
measurements explain a significant amount of the electoral 
variation in each district. Mann concluded that candidates are 
becoming more responsible for their own successes, rather than 
being at the mercy of national trends. The relationship between 
aggregate voting patterns and voting results in individual 
districts, however, remains to be fully explored.
SUMMARY
The thrust of current congressional election theory relies 
on the impact of incumbency to explain most electoral patterns.
It has been argued that the advantages incumbents enjoy can be 
traced to some very real characteristics of holding office 
including: better name recognition, subsidized office support, and 
an increased inclination among voters to choose incumbents. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that incumbents have become more 
effective in employing these advantages for electoral purposes. 
Clearly, the advantage of incumbency is a significant factor 
affecting election outcomes —  especially for congressional races
where the reelection rate of these candidates approach 90 percent. 
A major implication for our system of representative democracy 
resulting from this apparent low level of competition is the loss 
of electoral insecurity on the part of incumbents in safe seats. 
Without the fear of losing an election, it is possible that the 
accountability of incumbents to the voters may become eroded.
There is very little evidence, however, to support whether this 
has happened.
In an attempt to reconcile the impact of incumbency and the
"surge and decline" effect on congressional elections Jacobson and
36
Kernell have fashioned their own theory. In short, Jacobson and
Kernell suggest that political candidates pursue predictable
electoral careers where decisions to advance to a higher office
are based on a candidate's estimation of his own electoral
chances. Being risk averse by nature, quality candidates will
seldom venture into elections where they have less than a probable
chance of victory. Consequently, quality candidates, candidates
having the characteristics necessary for victory, seldom run
against incumbents or in election years where the "surge and
decline" effect may overwhelm them. As a result, the power of
incumbency and the inevitability of the "surge and decline" effect
become self-fulfilled prophecies.
A matter receiving little attention, but equally intriguing
is the characteristics of successful challengers. Nearly a third
of the members of the Ninety-Seventh Congress earned their seats
37
by defeating incumbents. This figure is surprisingly high,
given the arguments presented above. Exploring the common
characteristics of these candidates may lead to a better
understanding of the factors causing success at the polls. To
date, however, there are no major studies published inquiring into
38
the reasons for the success of these candidates.
The other major factors affecting congressional election 
patterns include: party affiliation, presidential elections, and 
the state of the economy. Research indicates that these three 
interrelated variables may explain the aggregate election 
phenomenon of "surge and decline." When examined on a district by 
district basis, however, these factors fail to predict who will 
win in a particular congressional district. Consequently, we must 
explore the impact of campaign technology and campaign spending on 
election outcomes as possible factors explaining this gap in 
congressional election theory. In the next chapter, we will 
review the uses of the new technologies employed by the modern 
congressional campaigns including: radio and television, opinion 
polling, and direct mail and telephone campaigning.
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CHAPTER II
CAMPAIGN TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY
The surge of television advertising in elections in recent
years demonstrates how political campaigns are willing to accept
new technologies which may give them an edge in achieving success.
Although the term technology often implies the use of some new
instrument or tool, technology also means the use of better
management skills. Since the advent of television campaigning,
campaign management has become increasingly professional at every
federal level.* This is due in part to the need for technical
expertise for managing the new technologies, but also because
increasing federal regulation of elections is forcing candidates
2
to better manage their campaigns. Consequently, professional
consultants and campaign managers are becoming more widely used by
campaigns at every federal level than ever before. Currently, it
is estimated that 20 percent of the average campaign budget is
3
spent on consultant fees and expenses.
In this section, we will describe some of these technologies 
and discuss how campaign professionals employ them in basic 
campaign strategy. We will address three specific technologies: 
electronic media (television and radio), research (polling), 
direct mail, and telephone solicitation. Much has already been 
said about the widespread use of paid broadcasting in political 
campaigns. Television and radio allow political candidates to 
reach a much broader audience with a more precise message than in 
any previous era. Opinion polling is the tool which indicates to 
the campaign what the message should be, whether the message is 
being received by the targeted audience, and whether the message 
will motivate the audience to perform as required on election day. 
Direct mail and telephone banks, on the other hand, are campaign 
tools used both as a medium for the campaign message and as 
fundraising techniques. These four interrelated technologies are 
powerful tools when used effectively, and together they have 
brought dramatic change to the art of modern political 
campaigning.
TELEVISION AND RADIO
The primary purpose for using television and radio in a
campaign, of course, is to contact the voters with the campaign 
4
message. The similarities between motivating an audience through 
television to buy a product or vote for a candidate have been well 
established by past media campaigns. To a media consultant, a 
political campaign can be viewed as a one-time, one-day sale for a
marketable product (the candidate). Consequently, much of what is 
known about the impact of radio and television advertising on the 
public has come as a result of advertising by business for 
consumer products. Since Eisenhower's first election, however, a 
field of media consultants specializing in politics has taken the 
fundamental advertising principles used in business and applied 
them successfully to political campaign advertising. Although 
these consultants vary in their style, understanding of the media, 
fees, and strategies, several similarities run through the 
industry.^
Cost structures for media services vary with each particular 
consultant, however, media professionals derive their costs for 
providing two basic services to the campaign: the creative costs 
associated with the production of the spot (political commercial) 
and the costs associated with developing a media schedule and
g
purchasing the air time. Costs associated with scheduling the 
spots, referred to as the time-buy, are standard throughout the 
consulting industry. The actual cost of the time-buy, which is 
the bulk of any campaign media budget, is based on the audience 
reach attained by the campaign spots and varies with each media 
market. The media consultant is paid a commission (usually 15 
percent of the total time-buy).^ Creative and production costs 
vary with each consultant depending on the demand and past success 
rate of a particular media consultant. Production costs for a 30 
second spot range from $5,000 to $100,000 depending on the
g
producer and quality of the work.
Diamond and Bates provide a comprehensive view of how
broadcast campaigning has evolved over the past 30 years by
9
looking at elections at every level. Although they devote much 
attention to the style of different media campaigns, they observed 
many similarities between campaign strategies and have developed a 
four-stage model describing a "typical" campaign media strategy.^ 
In this typical strategy, each media campaign attempts to educate 
the electorate regarding their candidate, the issues, and their 
opponent. It is a step-by-step process where each subsequent 
phase builds on the message presented in the previous steps. 
Although each phase represents a chronological step in the 
campaign process, each period may vary in time length or the 
number of spots they contain.
The first phase, the ID spot, aims to establish a foundation 
to build subsequent information. In its simplest form, the ID 
spot establishes basic name recognition for the candidate and may 
attempt to relate some favorable aspect of the candidate to the 
voters. It is common to see ads in this phase repeating the 
candidate's name several times to build this name recognition.
One ID spot format which has become a standard in the industry 
builds on the mispronunciation of the candidate's name. This type 
of ad is best illustrated by the ID spots used by Paul Tsongas for 
his initial run for the Senate in Massachusetts. At the end of 
his ID spots, a little girl repeatedly mispronounced Tsongas's 
name therby calling attention to the ads and building his name 
recognition as the candidate with the unusual name. Obviously,
the successful implementation of this phase is crucial for
challengers with low name recognition.
Spots used in the first phase are usually very simple and to
the point, but may also include other more complex messages.
Diamond and Bates cite John Kennedy's ID spots as an example where
Kennedy's name was repeated dozens of times, but where some
attention was given to the issue of religion.^ For incumbents,
an attempt is usually made to incorporate the visible trappings of
their office in the spots such as the Oval Office, Air Force One,
or The Hot Line in the case of an incumbent presidential
candidate. By doing this, they attempt to draw the voters'
attention to their experience in office and thereby incorporate
the incumbency bias into the election.
Phase two, the argument spot, employs a more complex message
based on the foundation built in the first phase. In this stage
reasons are given for voting for the candidate. As Diamond and
Bates put it: "We have been told who the candidate is; now we are
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supposed to be told what the candidate stands for." The content
and style of these spots can range significanty but, after viewing
250 argument spots spanning over 30 years of campaigning, Diamond
and Bates identified three common patterns of rhetoric. First,
they found, argument spots seldom get specific. This may be true
because the candidates are attempting to appeal to a wide
audience. Second, these ads are designed to appeal to the
emotions of the audience or, as Diamond and Bates put it, they are
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"hitting the hot buttons of the viewers." This aspect of the
argument spot is demonstrated by a variety of techniques. A
common approach used for provoking an emotional response is to
include the endorsement of a well-known public figure when
presenting a specific argument. The third aspect Diamond and
Bates found is that the argument spots make serious,
issue-oriented points. Usually, only a single issue is discussed
in each spot. An example of this type of advertisement is actress
Mary Tyler Moore (known for portraying career woman Mary Richards)
speaking for Jimmy Carter in 1980 as the candidate "truly
concerned about women's freedom" because he was the only
14
presidential candidate to support the ERA. In this instance,
the spot is designed to appeal to a broad, but specific portion of
the electorate: those favoring women's rights.
The third phase is referred to as "the attack" because it is
characterized by negative advertising. Diamond and Bates note
that "as soon as there were spots, there were attack spots."
Eisenhower, they point out, used mild attack rhetoric at this
stage of his first campaign when he referred to the Democrats as
well intentioned but misguided busdrivers (where the federal
. 15
government was likened to a bus). After the first two phases 
where the candidate has built name recognition and the voters have 
a sense of where he stands on the issues, the campaign then must 
give the voting audience the opportunity to draw a comparison 
between his opponent and himself. In many campaigns the attack 
spot provides the candidate with an instrument for questioning his 
opponent's qualifications or positions on the issues. In the
past, personal attacks have been used in this phase of the 
campaign but, in recent elections campaigns have relied on the use 
of surrogates to do the attacking. This is done to remove the 
burden of blame that may fall on the candidate if the voting 
audience reacts unfavorably to the attack spots. In 1976, for 
example, Gerald Ford made heavy, late use of some Georgia 
newspaper editorials opposed to Carter. In these ads, the 
newspapers served the function of campaign surrogate.
The final phase of the typical media campaign is used by each
candidate to sum up or make a concluding statement about his
candidacy. This phase is usually very short and positive in its
rhetoric. New campaign messages are seldom introduced at this
stage of the election, rather it is a time for the candidates to
appear in thoughtful repose. In presidential campaigns, this
phase has come to consist of a 30 or 60 minute election eve
16
special offering "hoopla and Hollywood." Lower-level campaigns 
frequently return to positive spots at this stage of the election.
Although Diamond and Bates provide a basic model for 
understanding the content of a campaign media strategy, media 
consultants can fine-tune the intensity of their message by 
adjusting the timing pattern of their spots. Like much of the 
work done in advertising, the strategies used in this area of 
media management were developed originally for consumer sales. 
Media timing strategies, however, are most significant for our 
research because they can be measured by the direct media 
expenditures paid by the campaign to the advertising networks.
Consequently, particular campaign timing strategies may depend on 
the flow of funds into the campaign.
Several timing strategies can be pursued by adjusting two 
basic factors in the timing plan: the length of the campaign and 
the rate of spending throughout the campaign.*^ The first factor, 
involves stretching or shrinking the time length of the total 
media campaign. Three variations can occur. The campaign can 
pursue a concentrated or "burst" strategy, where most of its media 
resources are spent in an abbreviated period. The purpose here is 
to maximize the reach of the campaign message to the voting public 
and avoid repetition to the same audience. This strategy is 
expected when a campaign has limited media resources and cannot 
compete in a full-length media campaign. As is the case in other 
areas of political campaigning, media campaigns have become longer 
rather than shorter —  often beginning in the Summer months —  and 
campaigns electing this approach may put themselves at a 
disadvantage. The second strategy, preferred by competitive 
campaigns to the concentrated approach, is the continuous 
strategy. In this approach, the campaign stretches its media 
resources over an extended period at a fairly constant rate of 
exposure. This strategy is preferred because it allows the 
campaign to educate the voters in a step-by-step process as 
Diamond and Bates suggest. The third stratgey, the intermittent 
approach, differs remarkably from the other two because it 
incorporates periods when no spots are being shown at all during 
the campaign. This approach alternates brief periods when spots
are running on the air with periods when they are not. This 
allows the campaign to both stretch the duration of the campaign 
and maintain a high intensity rate. The danger of this method, 
however, stems from having periods of blank air space allowing the 
opposition the opportunity to speak without a response.
The second factor involves adjusting the rate of spending 
throughout the duration of the campaign. Four approaches have 
evolved. The first and simplest strategy is the level spending 
approach where the campaign spends its media funds at a stable 
rate throughout the campaign. In this situation, the intensity of 
the campaign's message remains stable as well. Second, a rising 
approach is used when the campaign increases its spending over 
time. This approach attempts to create a sense of momentum for 
the viewing public because it builds from a relatively low to a 
high intensity level. At its best, this approach can create a 
bandwagon effect for the successful campaign but is used often in 
situations where campaign funds are unavailable at the early 
stages of the election. Third, the falling approach is the 
reverse of the rising technique because spending levels begin at a 
high rate and end at a much lower level. This situation may be 
used in cases where the candidate has very low name recognition in 
the district and the campaign chooses to emphasize its ID spots 
early in the campaign. Finally, an alternating approach may be 
used where the intensity rate varies over the course of the 
campaign. In this instance, certain phases of the campaign or
certain campaign spots are given more emphasis depending on the 
strategy objectives of the campaign.
The only study of record dealing with the effectiveness of
different media timing strategies for campaigns was performed by
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Hofstetter and Buss in 1980. They attempted to measure the 
impacts of a last-minute television blitz during the 1972 
presidential election. By comparing polling data from 40 days 
prior and immediately after election day, they found that news 
programming had a larger impact on voting behavior than paid 
broadcasting. Succeptability to last-minute television exposure 
seems to be a function of political involvement. For 
congressional races, where voter interest tends to be lower than 
presidential elections, last-minute broadcasting may encourage 
some reaction by the voting public.
OPINION POLLING
Accurate opinion polling is crucial for successful campaigns. 
When performed and interpreted properly, polls provide a blueprint 
for campaign planning and for developing the most effective 
campaign message. Polls can identify the voters' understanding of 
the stengths and weaknesses of a candidate and of his opponent. 
After these aspects of the contest are identified, the campaign 
can employ a media plan to reinforce these perceptions within the 
voting public favoring their own candidate. Then, polling is 
used to identify subtle changes in voter attitude and to determine 
whether the media effort is achieving its objectives. Like the
use of television in campaigns, polling was developed initially as 
a tool for consumer marketing, but was adopted later by polling 
consultants (pollsters) specializing in political campaigns.
Sabato has identified five different types of surveys used in
19
political campaigns today. Each type of poll is designed to 
achieve a specific purpose, but only major campaigns tend to have 
the resources available to use all five instruments. The initial 
poll, often conducted a year ahead of election day, is referred to 
as a "benchmark" or "baseline" poll. The purpose here is to 
identify the broadest issues at stake in the upcoming election and 
determine whether the candidate would run well under the 
prevailing circumstances. Projected "horse race" figures are 
estimated between the candidate and a number of potential 
opponents for the seat. At this stage of the election the 
benchmark poll allows the candidate to test the political waters 
and determine whether he should compete at all in this election. 
The sample size for this poll is large ranging from as many as 
4000 respondents in a national poll to as few as 400 for a 
congressional district.
The second stage of polling, conducted after the initial 
phase but still a few months from election day, is referred to as 
"follow-up" surveys. The purpose here is to refine the campaign's 
initial understanding of the mood of the voters and determine a 
course for the upcoming media campaign. It is in this phase, if 
not previously done, that the campaign identifies its key themes 
and messages which will be presented in the upcoming media
campaign. At this stage of a general election, the campaign's 
opponent has been selected and a more thorough understanding of 
his political weaknesses —  as seen by the voters —  must be 
determined for the upcoming media attack. The sample size for 
follow-up surveys range in size from 500 to 600 intervews. Two or 
more surveys are conducted depending on the events arising during
-i, • 20the campaign.
The third type of poll, the panel survey, involves the
reinterviewing of respondents of a previou poll. The purpose here
is to identify any major shift of opinion in the early stages of
the campaign. The sample, averaging 250 to 300, presents problems
for the pollster because of the difficulty resulting by trying to
21
reach some of these previous respondents. This phase of the
polling process is sometimes passed over by smaller campaigns.
Sabato identifies the next phase of polling, the "tracking"
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phase, as the most critical kind of election polling. When the 
media campaign begins, the campaign "tracks" voters'reactions to 
the spots by polling from 50 to 100 respondents each night. 
Although this sample size is too small to infer any statistical 
relevence in voter attitude, this technique does allow the 
pollster to estimate movement in voter attitude when several 
nights of calling have been completed. The pollster measures 
movement in voter attitude by using a moving average. After 
several nights of interviewing, the sample size has become large 
enough to estimate basic voter attitudes. The pollster then 
determines a moving average by dropping the oldest sample of calls
with each new night of interviewing. The advantage of this type 
of poll stems from the fact that it can allow the pollster to
determine the direction and rate of change in public opinion. The
other polls mentioned can provide only a snapshot of voter 
attitudes during the period of interviewing. Consequently, 
tracking polls are used often during the course of the media 
campaign to provide the media consultant with feedback on the 
effectiveness of his spots. They are essential for the 
fine-tuning of the campaign's electronic media.
The final type of poll mentioned by Sabato is the "focus 
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group" interview. This technique is not a random sample poll at
all rather, it is an interviewing method designed to obtain 
qualitative information about voters' attitudes. In a focus 
group interview, several respondents are brought together into an 
informal setting for a discussion of the topics of concern to the 
pollster. The pollster is present and leads the discussion to 
ensure that the group covers the desired discussion topics.
Often, the session is videotaped. The product of this technique 
is a list of ideas or phrases reflecting the attitudes of typical 
voters on the topics of interest. These phrases are useful for 
developing a better polling instrument or as spoken lines in a 
television spot.
Costs for polling services are standard throughout the 
industry. The pollster performs the interviews, provides the data 
processing services needed for calculating the required 
statistics, and interprets the findings for the campaign. The
total cost for a poll is based usually on the number and length of 
interviews made. On average, a 30-minute, 500 respondent 
benchmark poll will cost approximately $15,000. With the option 
of using in-house calling, however, polls can be cheaper but less 
accurate.24
DIRECT MAIL AND TELEPHONE CAMPAIGNING
While political direct mail and telephone banks have become
staples of the modern political campaign, very little is known
about how effective these technologies are for winning elections.
While both of these technologies have become increasingly the
domain of professionals, the manpower required to implement these
techniques —  especially for phone banks —  tends to come from
volunteers in the campaign organization. Sabato points out that
in races where resources are limited, the conflict between
budgeting for electronic media or for maintaining a campaign
organization is settled more often than not in favor of the media 
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people. Consequently, major campaigns will budget their 
resources to favor radio and television while direct mail and 
phone banks are used more extensively in lower level campaigns 
where paid broadcasting is not affordable.
While telephone banks are used mostly as a voter contact 
instrument, direct mail has been used both as a medium for the 
campaign message and most successfully, as a fundraising 
instrument. Telephone banks have replaced the old door-to-door 
canvass as an efficient way for campaigns to identify the name,
address, and candidate preference of the voting public. Prior to 
the election, each voter is called by a representative of the 
campaign and asked for this information. The conversation or 
message read by the solicitor is very simple and to the point. 
Should the respondent be favorable to the candidate, the campaign 
can solicit volunteer or financial help immediately, or simply 
call the respondent again just before election day during their 
"get-out-the-vote" (GOTV) effort. If the respondent is 
unfavorable to the candidate, the campaign does not contact him 
again. In a situation where the respondent is undecided about his 
vote, the campaign has the opportunity to mail campaign literature 
to him or present reasons for supporting their candidate over the 
telephone. The major costs associated with using telephone banks 
stem from the costs of the telephones and manhours needed to 
complete the telephone calls. Costs can be reduced, however, by 
selectively calling into geographic areas where large favorable 
voter turnouts are needed.
Direct political mail is used both as a voter contact tool
and for fundraising. When used for voter contact, political mail
can be sent to the respondent of a phone bank, as mentioned above,
or to households targeted by certain socio-economic
characteristics. In either case, the effective use of mail
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combines personal contact with an emotional appeal. Advanced 
computer and mailing technologies make both of these qualities 
possible. The impact that political direct mail has on voter 
behavior remains uncertain.
Some see direct mail campaigning as less effective than its
proponents would have you believe. Berrigan conducted a survey of
households receiving both direct mail contact and door-to-door
pamphleting. He found that households receiving direct mail were
not moved significantly while those receiving some personal
contact were moved significantly in terras of name recognition.
Berrigan concluded that pamphlets were useful only if accompanied
by personal contact and that direct mail was not cost effective.
These findings, he points out, are of chief importance for lower
level offices such as the Pennsylvania state races used in his
study where an average of 40 percent of their campaign budgets
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were devoted to printed materials.
When used as a fundraising tool, however, the success of
direct mail is easily measured. The most notable case of a
successful direct mail fundraising campaign involved The Reverend
Jerry Falwell. In October 1979, Falwell sent one of his most
successful "putting on the fleece" letters which raised nearly
$6.7 million in one month from his mailing list of 2.5 million 
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families. Although this demonstrates an extremely successful 
mailing, the steps taken by Falwell prior to this particular 
instance have been performed with similar success by political 
action committees, the major parties, and major political 
campaigns. Successful direct mail fundraising requires a period 
of prospecting where lists of likely contributors are mailed to 
for campaign contributions. Although these mailings, at best, 
tend to break even, the campaign will slowly build a list of
contributors willing to contribute several times to the campaign
29
when prompted by subsequent mailings. These sebsequent mailings 
can provide the campaign with much steady income during the course 
of the election but, the time needed to implement this strategy 
may not make this a viable alternative for some campaigns.
SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview 
of the various technologies available to congressional campaigns 
and how they have been used by past campaigns. Initially, we 
presented the argument that political campaigning has become 
increasingly professionalized; that the use of radio and 
television, opinion polling, and direct mail and phone banks have 
replaced the party apparatus of earlier campaigns.
These technologies can be used differently by different campaigns. 
When using radio and television, for instance, the campaign may 
opt for a burst strategy, a continuous strategy, or the 
intermittent approach. Until recently, it has been difficult to 
study which technological strategies are employed by campaigns and 
whether any particular approach is more successful than another. 
Since campaign technologies cannot be used without campaign funds, 
the answer to determining campaign strategy and success may lie in 
campaign budgeting preferences.
In the next chapter we will review past studies of money in 
politics. These studies will include the more general studies 
inquiring into whether spending levels affect electoral success as 
well as the more recent studies examining the spending patterns 
within campaigns. The purpose here will be to determine whether 
campaign budget preferences can be linked to electoral success.
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CHAPTER III
THE ROLE OF MONEY
This chapter examines the use and influence of money on 
congressional elections. The following analysis proceeds in three 
parts. First, the general spending patterns in federal elections 
are discussed describing the growth of overall campaign spending 
and the reasons for this phenomenon. Second, spending patterns 
within campaign structures will be examined. The purpose here 
will be to identify how congressional campaigns budget their 
resources to employ the new campaign technologies. Finally, the 
question whether money wins elections is explored.
PATTERNS IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Two trends in campaign finance have received considerable 
attention recently by scholars as well as by the public and press. 
The first aspect, involves campaign fundraising. Specifically, 
much attention has been given to the growth and influence of 
political action committees (PACs), organizations created to serve 
the political needs of special interest groups by supporting 
favorable candidates financially or through other means. The 
second dominant aspect is the ever increasing cost of campaigning.
Although the competitive aspect of campaigns naturally induces 
each side to spend more than the other, the introduction of mass 
media campaigning in recent years has greatly accelerated the cost 
of political campaigns. In this section we will examine briefly 
fundraising patterns in congressional races followed by a 
discussion of spending patterns and the causes of spiralling 
campaign costs.
A Note on PAC and Party Spending
Much has been written about PAC fundraising.* Although the 
purpose of this paper is not to deal specifically with the 
fundraising side of campaigning, the preponderance of PAC 
activities in congressional campaigns has some important
2
implications for our examination of campaign expenditures. The
most visible problem PAC spending poses for research in campaign
finance is the difficulty in measuring the impact of PAC
involvement on election outcome. Financial contributions by PACs
to individual candidates are regulated by law and are easy to
measure, but many of the nonfinancial benefits that come with the
involvement of a large organization in a political campaign, such
as volunteer recruitment and public endorsement, are difficult to 
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measure.
Although much public attention has been paid to the direct 
financial involvement of PAC organizations in political campaigns, 
recent campaign financial reports suggest that this concern may be 
exaggerated. Table 3-1 provides a breakdown of funding sources
TABLE 3-1
AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM VARIOUS FUNDING SOURCES 
FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES, 1981 - 1982 
(Thousands of Dollars)
Total Individuals PACs Party
Incumbents
Democrats 
(N = 218)
$269,801
(100%)
$166,112
(61.6%)
$101,864
(37.7%)
$ 1,824 
(0.7%)
Republicans 
(N = 168)
304,759
(100%)
187,274
(61.4%)
104,471
(34.3%)
13,014
(4.3%)
Challengers
Democrats 
(N = 166)
128,714
(100%)
89,385
(69.4%)
36,364
(28.3%)
1,918
(1.5%)
Republicans 
(N = 176)
130,303
(100%)
97,539
(74.9%)
23,977
(18.4%)
11,052
(8.5%)
Open Seats
Democrats 
(N = 51)
269,462
(100%)
191,361
(71.0%)
74,986
(27.8%)
3,115
(1.2%)
Republicans 
(N = 51)
329,661
(100%)
238,060
(72.2%)
73,684
(22.4%)
25,018
(7.6%)
SOURCE: Edie N. Goldenberg and Michael W. Traugott, Campaigning
for Congress, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1984), 
p. 65.
for House races during the 1981-82 election cycle. Surprisingly,
from 60 to 75 percent of all contributions came from individual
contributors —  rather than PACs —  making the individual
contributor by far the single largest source of campaign funding.
Furthermore, with the exception of Democratic incumbents,
Republican candidates do better than their Democratic opponents in
4
obtaining individual contributions.
PAC contributions represent the second largest source of 
funding providing from 18 to 37 percent of all campaign 
contributions. It is not surprising to find that incumbents do 
much better than challengers or open seat candidates in raising 
PAC contributions. Democrats, on the other hand, tend to do 
slightly better than Republicans in raising PAC money perhaps 
because more Democrats are incumbents. The remaining .7 to 8.5 
percent of campaign funding comes from party organizations. In 
this area of fundraising, the Republican Party dominates across 
the board.
The findings in Table 3-1 are important for our research for 
several reason. The most significant finding is that PAC 
involvement in congressional races is less important than public 
attention suggests. Campaign contributions from individuals on 
average far exceed PAC contributions. Consequently, the base of 
financial support for competitive campaigns tends to be broad and 
the likelihood of a single interest group having a strong impact 
on election outcome is small. Therefore, for our purposes, it 
will be assumed that the impacts of PAC involvement are offsetting
between the individual campaigns used in our case analyses unless 
special circumstances warrant a closer examination.
The second significant aspect of this recent data is that the 
extent of direct spending by the two major parties appears to be 
minimal in most races. This may be further evidence of the 
decline of the two-party system. More important, Republican 
candidates always receive larger amounts from their national party 
than do Democrats. In close elections, this edge in fundraising 
held by Republican candidates may be the factor deciding the 
election, especially where a crucial part of a campaign's strategy 
may depend on the availability of party funding. For this reason, 
we must be wary of campaigns receiving party contributions 
approaching the upper legal limits.
The data in Table 3-1 also sheds light on the question of how
political funds are distributed nationally. Researchers have
recognized for some time that campaign spending patterns by
national organizations, such as the DNC, RNC or major PACs, are
made on their estimation of victory within each district. These
organizations target their resources according to past election
trends within each district paying special attention to incumbency
and marginality factors."* Consequently, marginal open-seat races
are typically well funded. Contrary to this notion, however, a
study by Jacobson and Kernell suggests that incumbents generally
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benefit most by party assistance. Because the national 
congressional campaign committees are penetrated by officeholders, 
they argue, the money distribution policies of these organizations
seem to be extensions of their members' pursuit of private 
electoral goals. More important, because the majority of all 
campaign contributions come from individual donors, the level of 
personal wealth in each district may have a significant impact on 
the level of regional spending. To date, very little research 
examines the key factors affecting national or regional campaign 
spending patterns.
It can be concluded that successful campaigns must raise 
money from a number of sources in order to execute their stategies 
effectively. Surprisingly, the single greatest source of funding 
for congressional campaigns remains the individual contributor. 
Consequently, the impacts of PAC and party spending are less 
significant to election outcome than public attention suggests.
For the purpose of this paper, party and PAC spending factors will 
be considered insignificant to our case analyses unless 
circumstances warrant special attention.
Campaign Spending Patterns
The second major aspect of modern campaign finance is the 
ever increasing cost of campaigning at every federal level. Table 
3-2 presents the costs of campaigning for President since Lincoln 
(1860). With few exceptions, combined campaign expenditures rise 
significantly with each new election. This general trend becomes 
more dramatic after 1948, when television campaigning became 
widely used. Whereas Truman and Dewey spent a combined total of 
$4,863,630 in 1948, the figure better than doubled in the 1952
TABLE 3-2
COSTS OF PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1860 - 1980 
Year Republican Democrat
1860 $ 100 000 Lincoln* $ 50 000 Douglas
1864 125 000 Lincoln* 50 000 McClellan
1868 150 000 Grant* 75 000 Seymour
1872 250 000 Grant* 50 000 Greeley
1876 950 000 Hayes* 900 000 Tilden
1880 1 100 000 Garfield* 335 000 Hancock
1884 1 300 000 Blaine 1,400 000 Cleveland*
1888 1 350 000 Harrison* 855 000 Cleveland
1892 1 700 000 Harrison 2,350 000 Cleveland*
1896 3 350 000 McKinley* 675 000 Bryan
1900 3 000 000 McKinley* 425 000 Bryan
1904 2 096 000 T. Roosevelt* 700 000 Parker
1908 1 655 518 Taft* 629 341 Bryan
1912 1 071 549 Taft 1,134 848 Wilson*
1916 2 441 565 Hughes 2,284 590 Wilson*
1920 5 417 501 Harding* 1,470 371 Cox
1924 4 020 478 Coolidge* 1,108 836 Davis
1928 6 256 111 Hoover* 5,342 350 Smith
1932 2 900 052 Hoover 2,245 975 F. Roosevelt*
1936 8 892 972 Landon 5,194 741 F. Roosevelt*
1940 3 451 310 Willkie 2,783 654 F. Roosevelt*
1944 2 828 652 Dewey 2,169 077 F. Roosevelt*
1948 2 127 296 Dewey 2,736 334 Truman*
1952 6 608 623 Eisenhower* 5,032 926 Stevenson
1956 7 778 702 Eisenhower* 5,106 651 Stevenson
1960 10 128 000 Nixon 9,797 000 Kennedy*
1964 16 026 000 Goldwater 8,757 000 Johnson*
1968 25 402 000 Nixon* 11,594 000 Humphrey
1972 61 400 000 Nixon* 30,000 000 McGovern
197 6? 21 786 641 Ford 21,800 000 Carter*
1980 29 188 188 Reagan* 29,352 767 Carter
* indicates winner
1976 represents the first time public funding was used for 
presidential elections. The Republican National Committee spent an 
additional $1.4 million on Ford's campaign while the Democratic 
gational Committee spent an additional $2.8 on Carter's campaign.
In 1980 the RNC spent an additional $4.5 million on Reagan's 
campaign while the DNC spent an additional $4 million on Carter's 
campaign.
SOURCE: Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Politics: Money,
Elections, and Political Reform, Third Edition, (Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1984), p. 7.
contest between Eisenhower and Stevenson where the candidates 
together spent $11,641,549.
Since 1974, when detailed campaign expenditure data first 
became available for Senate and House races, total combined 
campaign costs have risen at a rate well above the consumer price 
index. As Table 3-3 describes, combined congressional campaign 
spending grew from $66.4 million in 1972 to $343.9 million in 
1982. This represents an average annual growth rate of over 16 
percent. When distinctions are made by congressional chamber, 
total House race expenditures increased by an average annual rate 
of 14.2 percent while total Senate campaign expenses grew by a 
whopping 21.1 percent per year, each significantly exceeding the 
average annual consumer price index.
Looking at House races independently, it is apparent that 
more candidates are spending greater amounts than in the past (see 
Table 3-4). In 1974, only ten House candidates from both parties 
spent more than $200,000 for their election campaigns. By 1982 
this figure grew to a dramatic number of 353 House candidates. 
Furthermore, in each election year since 1976, more Republican 
House candidates exceeded the $200,000 spending threshold than 
Democrats suggesting that Republican candidates are better 
financed•
A closer examination of House spending patterns supports the 
proposition that Republicans spend more than Democrats at all 
levels, but more important, that incumbents tend to outspend 
challengers. Table 3-5 breaks down the House campaign data by
TABLE 3-3
CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES, 1972 - 1982 
(Millions of Dollars)
Year Total Senate House
1972 $ 66.4 $ 26.4 $ 40.0
1974 73.9 28.9 45.0
1976 125.5 46.3 79.2
1978 197.3 86.7 110.6
1980 238.9 102.9 136.0
1982 343.9 139.3 204.6
SOURCE: Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Politics: Money,
Elections, and Political Reform, Third Edition, (Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1984), p. 138.
TABLE 3-4
HOUSE CANDIDATES WITH NET EXPENDITURES GREATER THAN $200,000,
(1974 - 1982)
Year Republican Democrat Total
1974 4 6 10
1976 16 15 31
1978 68 60 128
1980 114 91 205
1982 183 170 353
SOURCE: Money and Politics in the United States: Financing
Elections in the 1980^s, Michael J. Malbin, ed., (Washington: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1984), p. 280.
TABLE 3-5 
HOUSE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES 
(Net Dollars 1974 - 1978)
1974 1976 1978
All Candidates
Total Expenditures 44,051,125 60,046,006 86,129,169
Mean Expenditure 53,384 73,316 109,440
Mean, Democrats 53,993 74,563 108,986
Mean Republicans 54,835 71,945 109,995
Incumbents
Mean, All Incumbents 56,539 79,398 111,159
Mean, Democrats 38,743 73,322 103,519
Mean, Republicans 80,339 91,456 126,022
Challengers
Mean, All Challengers 40,015 50,795 74,802
Mean, Democrats 59,266 46,330 70,948
Mean, Republicans 20,644 53,352 77,012
Open Seats
Mean, All Open-seat 
Candidates 90,426 124,506 201,049
Mean, Democrats 99,743 145,497 211,871
Mean, Republicans 80,751 101,802 189,205
SOURCE: Money and Politics in the United States: Financing
Elections in the 1980^s, Michael J. Malbin, ed., (Washington: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1984), p. 280.
TABLE 3-5 (Continued)
HOUSE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES 
(Net Dollars 1974 - 1978)
1980 1982
All Candidates
Total Expenditures 115,222,222 174,921,844
Mean Expenditure 153,221 228,060
Mean, Democrats 143,277 213,369
Mean Republicans 164,282 245,020
Incumbents
Mean, All Incumbents 165,081 265,001
Mean, Democrats 158,010 247,573
Mean, Republicans 177,345 287,543
Challengers
Mean, All Challengers 121,751 151,717
Mean, Democrats 93,313 141,390
Mean, Republicans 139,111 162,354
Open Seats
Mean, All Open-seat 201,790 284,476
Candidates
Mean, Democrats, 180,312 256,004
Mean, Republicans 224,116 314,547
SOURCE: Money and Politics in the United States: Financing
Elections in the 1980^s, Michael J. Malbin, ed., (Washington: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1984), p. 280.
party and candidate status. As Table 3-5 indicates, average total 
expenditures spent on House elections grew from $54,539 in 1974 to 
$157,128 in 1980, an average annual growth rate of 12 percent. In 
every election year except 1976, average Republican campaign 
spending exceeded that for Democrats. Incumbents, however, always 
outspent challengers during this time period regardless of party 
affiliation. For open seats, where national party resources are 
targeted for spending, the cost of campaigning is expensive with 
an average of $209,393 spent by each campaign in each election 
during 1980.
The main implication of these findings is the increasing 
difficulty for average citizens to run for federal office. In 
races with incumbents running for reelection, it is clear that 
challengers seldom are able to match the spending levels of their 
incumbent opponents, but in open seat contests the lack of an 
incumbent attracts national party and PAC attention to the race 
encouraging higher spending. Consequently, many potential 
congressional candidates are eliminated from competition because 
they cannot reach the minimum threshold of campaign spending which 
continues to get ever higher.
Several factors have contributed to the extraordinary rise in 
campaign costs including inflation and the shear competitive 
nature of the two-party electoral system, but most scholars agree 
that the primary cause in recent years is the increasing use of 
paid political advertising particularly for television. Since 
Heard's study in 1956, which is the first to investigate the
allocation of resources within campaign structures, media and 
advertising expenses for radio, television, newspapers, billboards 
and other printed materials amounted to more than half of all 
campaign expenditures for both parties.^ Furthermore, Heard found 
that between September and November 1956, the Republicans and 
Democrats spent 23 and 20 percent or $3 million and $2.3 million 
of their respective campaign budgets on television alone. These 
figures express a dramatic change in campaign budgeting patterns 
because television advertising was virtually nonexistent in the 
1948 presidential elections yet, only two election cycles later, 
both parties were willing to devote a significant amount of their 
resources in the new technology.
It remains unclear whether campaign budgets have been 
affected most by growing costs in the television industry or 
because campaigns have continued to expand their use of 
television. The answer may be both. As Table 3-6 demonstrates, 
the combined spending for radio and television by presidential 
campaigns has grown from $3.6 million in 1952 to over $30.7 in 
1980. This represents an average annual spending increase of 15 
percent, but this growth rate is very erratic when examined from 
election to election. In 1964, for example, electronic media 
spending increased by a whopping 267 percent over the previous 
election, whereas television and radio spending actually dropped 
by nearly 44 percent between the 1968 and 1972 campaigns.
When examined as a percentage of combined aggregate campaign 
spending (see Table 3-7), a clear but unexpected relationship is
TABLE 3-6
AGGREGATE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION TIME 
(Presidential General Election Campaigns, 1952 - 1980)
Year Republican Democrat Total
1952 $ 2,046,000* $1,530,000 $3,576,000
1956 2,886,000* 1,763,000 4,649,000
1960 1,865,000 1,142,000* 3,007,000
1964 6,370,000 4,674,000* 11,044,000
1968 12,598,000* 6,143,000 18,741,000
1972 4,300,000* 6,200,000 10,500,000
1976 7,875,000 9,081,321* 16,956,321
1980 12,324,000*a 18,400,000 30,724,000
* designates winner 
Excludes approximately $245,000 in coordinated expenditures by 
the Republican National Committee for media buys on behalf of the 
Reagan-Bush campaign or approximately $4.2 million spent by the 
RNC during the general election for all Republican federal office 
candidates.
SOURCE: Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Politics: Money,
Elections, and Political Reform, Third Edition, (Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1984), p. 13.
TABLE 3-7
RADIO AND TELEVISION EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
AGGREGATE CAMPAIGN SPENDING 
(Presidential General Election Campaigns, 1952 - 1980)
Year Aggregate Aggregate Percentage of
Campaign Radio & T.V. Expenditures Used
Spending Expenditures For Radio & T.V.
1952 $ 11,641,549 $ 3,576,000 30.7%
1956 12,885,353 4,649,000 36.1
1960 19,925,000 3,007,000 15.1
1964 24,783,000 11,044,000 44.6
1968 36,996,000 18,741,000 50.7
1972 91,400,000 10,500,000 11.5
1976 43,586,641 16,956,321 38.9
1980 58,540,955 30,724,000 52.5
SOURCE: Table 3-1 and Table 3-7.
seen. Since 1952, the percentage of aggregate campaign resources 
used for radio and television over total aggregate campaign 
spending has increased steadily with the exception of every third 
election year (1960 and 1972). In each of these exceptional 
years, a dramatic decline in percentage has taken place because 
while all campaign spending rose significantly, less money was 
spent on radio and television than in the previous election.
There is little to explain this phenomena because each of these 
elections were run under different circumstances: 1960 was a close 
open-seat election between Kennedy and Nixon while in 1972 an 
incumbent Nixon easily defeated McGovern.
Disregarding this "third election year correction cycle," it 
is safe to say that the percentage of combined financial resources 
used by presidential campaigns for radio and television has 
steadily increased over time. Furthermore, since the presidential 
elections of the 1950"s, radio and television campaigning has 
become the norm in American politics with television advertising 
being used in elections at every federal level. The example of 
television demonstrates how modern political campaigns are willing 
to accept new technologies which may provide a winning edge. In 
the following sections we will examine the use of television and 
other campaign technologies in congressional campaigns.
INTERNAL BUDGETING PATTERNS
Much can be learned about how campaigns implement their 
strategies by examining their expenditure patterns. Until 1974, 
however, when changes in federal election law required campaigns 
to itemize receipts and expenditures, very little was known about 
spending patterns within campaigns. Prior to the 1974 FEC 
regulations, Adamany was able to observe the spending of 
Democratic candidates for the 1964 gubernatorial and senatorial
g
elections in Wisconsin. It is not surprising Adamany found that
nearly 53 percent of the combined expenditures of these major
campaigns were budgeted for mass media advertising followed by 18
percent for party organization expenses and 10 percent for
campaign materials. Surprisingly, only one percent of all
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campaign expenditures were budgeted for opinion polling.
Taking advantage of the recent changes in the election laws, 
Goldenberg and Traugott have been able to compile spending 
statistics for House races during 1977 and 1 9 78.^ Table 3-8 
provides their basic breakdown of congressional campaign 
expenditures by each candidate's likelihood of victory. All of 
the candidates in their sample spent an average of $67,575. It is 
not surprising that vulnerable incumbents spent much more than the 
average candidate ($113,409), or that the sure losers spent the 
least ($17,895 on average). The low figure for sure losers 
demonstrates that a minimum budget threshold may exist for 
campaigns to be competitive.
TABLE 3-8
HOUSE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET 
BY LIKELIHOOD OF VICTORY, 1977 - 1978
All Sure Hopefuls Vulnerables Sure
Candidates Winners Losers
($64,575) ($43,007) ($62,018) ($113,409) ($17,895)
Advertising 58.1% 51.0% 57.7% 62.6% 59.1'
Staff Salaries 16.1 13.9 18.7 19.0 16.1
Office Expenses 7.6 8.5 8.1 6.5 7.1
Financial
Transactions 5.4 8.2 5.7 1.4 6.8
Organized
Events 4.5 8.7 2.7 4.5 3.3
Staff Expenses 5.1 7.1 3.1 3.3 5.1
Research 2.7 2.3 3.2 2.4 2.0
Other .5 .2 .7 .3 .4
SOURCE: Edie N. Goldenberg and Michael W. Traugott, Campaigning
for Congress, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1984), p. 
86.
Like Adamany, Goldenberg and Traugott found that most 
campaign funds (58 percent) were spent on advertising. This was 
followed by staff salaries and expenses (21 percent combined 
total) which is a higher percentage of the budget than that found 
in Adamany's state-wide elections. This is expected because of 
the economies-of-scale existing for the state-wide races. Of the 
incumbents in the sample, those considered vulnerable spent 
significantly more (62.6 percent) of their resources on 
advertising than those considered sure winners (51 percent). This 
figure is magnified even further by the fact that the vulnerable 
incumbents spent much more money overall ($113,409 on average) 
than incumbents considered sure winners ($43,007 on average).
Table 3-9 compares the likelihood of a candidate's victory 
with a breakdown of media expenditures. Vulnerable incumbents had 
the largest media budgets spending, on average, $70,950 which is 
nearly twice the overall average media budget of $36,643. Sure 
losers, on the other hand, failed to raise even one third of the 
average expenditures spent by all campaigns on their media budgets 
($10,569). This suggests that electoral success may require some 
minimum threshold of spending on campaign media.
The single largest area of media spending for congressional 
campaigns in this study was for printing costs (32.6 percent on 
average) followed by television (23.4 percent). Because 
congressonal races are lower-level campaigns, budgeting decisions 
appear to favor building an organizational structure (which 
requires printed materials), rather than depending solely on
TABLE 3-9
HOUSE CAMPAIGN MEDIA EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MEDIA
BUDGET BY LIKELIHOOD OF VICTORY, 1977 - 1978
All
Candidates
($36,643)
Sure
Winners
($21,967)
Hopefuls
($35,826)
Vulnerables
($70,950)
Sure
Losers
($10,569;
Printing 32.6% 37.6% 33.9% 28.3% 26.6:
Television 23.4 20.2 23.9 24.3 36.3
Undesignated
Activities 22.7 6.8 20.5 30.2 12.2
Newspapers 8.7 18.2 7.6 7.3 12.1
Radio 6.5 9.0 6.5 5.8 6.6
Outdoor 3.6 6.5 4.0 2.6 3.8
Movies, Photos,
Misc. 2.5 1.7 3.6 1.5 2.3
SOURCE: Edie N. Goldenberg and Michael W. Traugott, Campaigning for
Congress, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1984), p. 90.
electronic media advertising. This may be true because television 
expenses are not cost-effective for the size of budgets projected 
by these campaigns. Newspaper advertising receives, on average, 
8.7 percent of the typical congressional media dollar. One 
unusual observation regarding internal spending patterns is that 
the sure winners spend more than twice the group average on 
newspaper advertising (18.2 percent of their budgets). It is 
possible that because the sure winners do not feel the need to 
actively campaign, they can afford to demonstrate token campaign 
activity by advertising in a passive medium such as the newspaper.
Surprisingly, nearly 23 percent of the average congressional 
campaign budget is spent on undesignated activities. Several 
media functions may be grouped together under this single 
category. Among these costs may be the consultant fees and 
expenses which suggests that these campaigns may benefit from 
considerable expertise. The fact that this area of spending is 
relatively high, however, suggests that this is not the case. 
Instead, there may be a great lack of proper media planning or 
control over the uses of media funds because much is spent on this 
undefined area of the budget rather than on specific media 
technologies. Sure winners spend only about a third as much in 
this area as the other contenders suggesting that winning 
campaigns predesignate their expenditures.
Table 3-10 demonstrates how incumbents, open-seat candidates, 
and challengers for Congress budget their campaign media dollar. 
There is very little difference in the way each of these
TABLE 3-10
HOUSE CAMPAIGN MEDIA EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MEDIA 
BUDGET BY CANDIDATE STATUS, 1977 - 1978
Incumbents
($38,481)
Open-Seats
($69,448)
Challengers
($25,105)
Printing
Television
Undesignated
Activities
Newspapers
Radio
Outdoor
Movies, Photos, 
Misc.
32.8%
20.2
23.4
10.9
6.6
3.8
2.5
31.3%
26.4
25.9
5.4
6.4 
2.8
2.0
33.4%
25.6
19.0
8.2
6.4 
4.0
3.5
SOURCE: Edie N. Goldenberg and Michael W. Traugott, Campaigning
for Congress, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1984), p. 
90.
candidates budget their media resources. Printing is the single 
largest area of spending for all candidates followed by 
television. For incumbents television spending is third behind 
undesignated activities. Incumbents (who tend to be sure winners 
as well) spend much more than the other candidates on newspaper 
advertising.
Table 3-11 provides a comparison between incumbents, 
challengers, and open-seat candidates for total campaign spending 
over time. For all three candidate types, most of their campaign 
expenditures are disbursed during the four months prior to 
election day. Incumbents spend 67 percent of their budget during 
this final stage while open-seat candidates spend over 64 percent 
and challengers spend nearly 80 percent. All three candidate 
types tend to save their resources until the final stages of the 
campaign.
Generally, money spent during the year prior to the election 
year is used to run a benchmark poll, to hire a campaign staff, 
and to initiate the campaign fundraising activities. Challengers 
spend less than 2 percent of their projected budget during the 
year prior to the election year and spend nothing until the fourth 
quarter of that year. This suggests that most challengers may not 
consider becoming candidates for the office until the year of the 
election putting them at a severe disadvantage with the incumbent 
who already has a fundraising operation in place and who has 
already spent, on average, 16 percent of his projected budget. 
Furthermore, because challenger candidates are not spending money
79.
TABLE 3-11
MEAN EXPENDITURES OVER TIME FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES,
BY STATUS, 1977 - 1978
(Actual Dollars)
Incumbents Challengers Open-Seats 
(N = 71) (N = 74) (N = 22)
Year: 1977
1st Quarter $3,956 $0 $0
(3.7%) (— ) (— )
2nd Quarter $3,985 $0 $411
(3.8%) (— ) (0.2%)
3rd Quarter $3,382 $41 $1,252
(3.2%) (0%) (0.6%)
4th Quarter $5,847 $909 $5,075
(5.5%) (1.3%) (2.6%)
Total 1977 $17,170 $950 $6,738
Year: 1978
(16.2%) (11.3%) (3.4%)
1st Quarter $6,138 $1,957 $18,838
(5.9%) (2.9%) (9.7%)
2nd Quarter $11,561 $11,221 $43,356
(10.9%) (16.6%) (22.4%)
3rd/4th Quarter $70,731 $53,663 $124,801
(July 1 - ) (67.0%) (79.2%) (64.4%)
Two Year Total $105,645 $67,791 $193,733
SOURCE: Edie N. Goldenberg and Michael W. Traugott, Campaigning
for Congress, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1984), 
p. 96.
during the early stages of the elction cycle, they are probably 
unaware of their true chances for success because their campaigns 
have not performed the proper amount of benchmark polling. 
Candidates in open-seat elections, on the other hand, spend, on 
average, 3.4 percent of their budgets by the first of the elction 
year. Consequently, they are probably better aware of their 
chances for victory and have a more realistic sense of what must 
be accomplished during the campaign to win election due to the 
results of their early polling.
STUDIES OF MONEY IN POLITICS: WHO WINS?
Prior to 1972, when federal restrictions required political
campaigns to file detailed contribution and expenditure reports,
very little was known or written about campaign spending.
Consequently, much of the work done until then focuses on
gathering basic data such as aggregate spending levels, broadcast
expenditures and contributions by labor and business
organizations.^ Because the earliest studies relied on simple
and often incomplete aggregate data, early explanations regarding
the basic relationship between money and winning elections were
sometimes flawed. At one time, for instance, it was believed that
those who spent the most money won elections. This rule, however,
fell apart when both Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman were
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elected while spending less money than their opponents.
Since 1972, there has been an explosion of research examining 
the relationship between money and politics. Money has come to be 
regarded as one of several political resources required by 
successful campaigns but, the true impact of money on electoral 
victory is still disputed. Working independently, Welch and 
Jacobson established the framework for current research by being 
the first to use econometric methods and production theory to 
examine the relationship between money and votes.
By employing a simple Cobb-Douglas production function, Welch
explains how money, an election input, affects the expected vote,
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the election output. After testing his initial model using 
state legislative electoral data, Welch drew several conclusions. 
First, his production function demonstrates that the marginal 
percentage of vote gained by a candidate diminishes as total 
campaign expenditures increase. This finding is surprising as 
previous logic held that higher campaign expenditures would 
necessarily lead to more votes. Second, he found that money spent 
during a primary is more effective than money spent during the 
general election. This is true, he argues, because most voters 
participating in a general election select on the basis of party 
label. Finally, he concluded that incumbency has a greater impact 
on election outcome than all other factors considered. This last 
point is not surprising given the high reelection rates of 
incumbents. Welch was not willing to say, however, what the value 
of incumbency is in monetary terras.
Jacobson"s research was prompted by the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1974 and the limits this law imposed on party
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contributions to federal candidates. Like Welch, Jacobson 
employed a regression analysis to develop a model for predicting 
election results and found that campaign expenditures, incumbency 
and candidate party strength all have a significant impact on the 
proportion of the vote won by a candidate. Furthermore, he found 
that campaign money is most important for challengers. Jacobson 
points out that funding allows these candidates to build name 
recognition among the voters —  an advantage that incumbents 
already have. The more challengers spend, he argues, the better 
known they become and therefore more electable. Because the 1974 
FEC Act limits campaign spending by political parties, Jacobson 
concludes, the law may reduce the chances of challengers to win 
races and thereby strengthen the role of incumbency in determining 
election outcome.
In the discussion that followed, several refinements were 
made to the initial findings by Welch and Jacobson. Owens and 
Olson experimented with different methods of measurement for the 
various factors in the equation with the hope of refining its 
election predicting capability.^ Eventually, they were able to 
explain as much as 90 percent of the variability in the vote 
percentage for a candidate by the factors of incumbency, campaign 
expenditures and party strength. They found campaign expenditures 
to be the best predictor followed by party strength (as measured 
by presidential vote) and incumbency respectively. Although their
findings contradict the widely held belief that incumbency is the 
chief factor in getting elected, they found through path analysis 
that incumbency has substantial indirect impact on election 
outcome through the intervening variable of spending.
Arrington and Ingalls tested Jacobson's model on local races 
in North Carolina from 1975 through 1 9 8 0 . ^  Their research is 
unique in that the set of elections in the sample set included 
non-partisan elections and primaries and elections for 
single-member and multiple-seat districts. They found that 
incumbents were favored in every type of election receiving from 
three to twenty percent more votes than challengers. Campaign 
spending, they found through step-wise regression, is always 
either the first or second most significant independent variable 
in each election. Furthermore, they concluded that the role of 
campaign spending is as strong in partisan general elections as in 
primaries or non-partisan elections. Campaign expenditures, they 
argue, are most important in single-member districts, where the 
nature of the constituencies remain fairly constant. Party 
labels, they found, did not reduce the advantage of those who 
spent more.
Silberman modified Welch's production function suggesting 
instead that the expected vote does not depend on the absolute 
level of each candidate's inputs, rather the relative level of 
each candidate's inputs vis-a-vis the other is what is 
important.^ Rather than using absolute data in his model, 
Silberman employs a ratio scale for each of the factors mentioned
by Welch and Jacobson: relative campaign expenditures, relative 
incumbency, and relative party strength. He tests his model using 
1972 congressional election data and determines that the three 
factors mentioned above account for nearly 80 percent of the 
variance in the expected vote. Consequently, Silberman drew many 
of the same conclusions as Welch, but two points about Silberman's 
study are most important. First, Silberman found that the vote 
percentage for a candidate increases at a decreasing rate despite 
the candidate may continue to increase expenditure inputs at a 
constant rate. In effect, the law of diminishing returns takes 
place with respect to a candidate's campaign investment. Second, 
incumbency is a particularly strong factor. Silberman argues that 
given similar campaign expenditure levels between incumbent and 
challenger candidates, the advantages of incumbency usually 
determines the winner.
In a later study with Yochum, Silberman tries to determine
how much money is needed for candidates to win under various 
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circumstances. They found during the 1972 and 1974 elections 
that in races where spending levels were low (under $100,000), the 
marginal benefit of increasing campaign expenditures aided first 
and second terra incumbents most of all followed by challengers and 
incumbents with more than two terms. Furthermore, all marginal 
increases in voter percentage disappeared in races where the 
candidates spent over $175,000. In contests where spending was 
high, they found that the benefits of marginality belong to the 
challengers. Silberman and Yochum concluded that spending limits
set above $175,000 are useless and that limits set lower would 
always favor incumbents. They also found that Democrats were able 
to achieve higher absolute levels of change in marginal vote than 
Republicans. Whether this phenomenon was a result of electoral 
backlash to the Nixon Administration's failures, they were not 
willing to say. In all cases, the marginal change in vote 
percentage never exceeded four percent suggesting that the current 
high levels of spending in congressional races are used to gain 
only a very small percentage of the electorate. This last point 
is most significant because it suggests that in some elections, no 
amount of money will help a candidate win. In very close 
elections, however, additional campaign spending may be the 
deciding factor.
Welch drew similar conclusions in a work published five years
19
after his original model was developed. In this study, Welch 
analyzes competitive House races in 1972 (the first year campaign 
expenditure data were available). Welch found, as expected, that 
money does influence voting in House elections, but the effect was 
small. In other words, he suggests, had funding limits or public 
financing been used, very few elections would have been changed.
In addition, Welch examined how campaign fundraising is affected 
by district characteristics and the success potential of the 
candidate. He found that total contributions are positively 
related to median income and the dispersion of income in the 
district. Furthermore, he found that campaign funds are raised 
more easily by candidates who are perceived to be likely winners.
These conclusions suggest some of the difficulties encountered by
challengers who need sufficient funding to be competitive yet are
not perceived as potential winners early in the race or are
running in a poor district.
A study by Glantz, Abramowitz and Burkart considers the
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marginal vote contribution of campaign expenditures. After
examining election data from California Assembly and House races,
they found that incumbents' expenditures do not affect their
margin of victory; rather, their margin of victory tends to
decline as more money is spent. "It appears," they suggest, "that
when a strong challenger mounts an effective campaign, he raises
substantial sums of money and the incumbent responds by raising
more money than he would have raised without a strong 
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challenger." The main factor determining the closeness of an
election, they conclude, is not the fact that the incumbent spends
more than the challenger but rather that the challenger is unable
to raise sufficient quantities of money. Furthermore, few
challengers probably spend enough to witness diminishing returns
as Silberman had argued earlier.
In a follow-up study to his original research, Jacobson
demonstrates how spending by challengers has a substantial impact
on election outcomes while spending by incumbents has relatively 
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little impact. Furthermore, Jacobson found the more incumbents 
spend, the worse they do. This point is significant because it 
contradicts the diminishing marginal returns assumption held 
previously, but supports the contentions made by Glantz,
Abramowitz and Burkart. He explains that incumbents apparently 
increase or decrease their spending in reaction to changes in the 
amount spent by opponents. Incumbents, he argues, acquire funds 
only in proportion to the felt necessity to do so. Consequently, 
the intensity of campaign spending on the part of an incumbent is 
a function of their likelihood of defeat. Jacobson concludes 
that:
Campaign spending helps candidates, most particularly 
nonincumbents, by bringing them to the attention of 
voters. It is not the case that well-known candidates 
simply attjj^ct more money; rather, money buys 
attention.
Surprisingly, only two years later, Jacobson became less 
committed to this conclusion. After further study on the matter, 
Jacobson was willing to conclude that well-known candidates 
attract votes and money:
Campaign spending may help win popular support, and 
thus votes, but characteristics that also help to 
attract votes —  personal charm or "charisma," 
political skill and experience —  should also ease the 
job of fund raising. Candidates who are well known 
and who have political experience (and thus a greater 
expectation of success) raise money more easily, spend 
it, thereby increasing their popularity further, 
acquiring in consequence even more money, and so on, 
the ultimate payoff coqjjng in the form of additional 
votes on election day.
In other words, money may flow to a candidate for the same 
reasons that votes do or, as Jacobson suggests, the relationship 
between expenditures and votes may be reciprocal. The expectation 
that a candidate will do well may be the factor which brings 
additional campaign contributions. This reasoning ultimately
suggests election outcomes may result in part as self fulfilling 
prophesies where money and votes flow to the candidate who 
successfully argues that he has the best chance for victory. 
Either way, media spending is an integral part of the successful 
campaign. Jacobson's observation leads to the question of 
internal campaign spending patterns —  particularly the 
effectiveness of media expenditures. Since money is considered 
crucial for bringing the candidacy of a challenger to the 
attention of the public, the relationship between campaign money 
and media spending, the mechanism through which public attention 
is sought, is of chief importance to our study.
Several studies inquire into the effectiveness of television
and radio spending. As in other areas of campaign finance
research, early studies of campaign media spending were
preoccupied with the legislative regulation of campaign spending.
Dawson and Zinser performed one of the seminal studies in this 
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area in 1971. In their research, Dawson and Zinser employed a 
regression analysis to compare the share of vote received by 
congressional candidates to several independent factors including 
incumbency, party, and level of media expenditures. They found 
that a significant determinant of the winner's broadcast 
expenditures, in conjunction with incumbency, is the level of 
broadcasting expenditures incurred by the losing candidates. In 
other words, candidates seek to outspend one another in 
broadcasting expenditures and those who do tend to win elections.
Palda found similar results in his study of Canadian races
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during the same election cycle. Using a similar type of 
regression analysis, Palda rejected his null hypothesis that no 
advertising affect existed in his sample. Palda's study is 
significant, however, because he is is concerned with the 
existence of a saturation point in media advertising where 
additional media spending will have no marginal impact on the 
election outcome. To answer this question, he correctly compares 
the share of total vote received by each candidate rather than 
assuming a winner-take-all format. Palda fails to find the 
existence of a voter saturation point.
Jacobson conducted a great deal of research in the area of 
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media spending. Like Dawson and Zinser, he employed a 
regression analysis approach to compare broadcast expenditures 
with incumbency and party strength indices. Unlike his 
predecessors, Jacobson examined races at different federal levels 
and at different stages in the election cycle. He concluded that 
broadcast campaigning has its greatest effect in the presidential 
races. Furthermore, broadcast campaigning has its greatest effect 
in primary elections rather than in the general elections. Like 
the other regression research performed previously, this study 
also concluded that broadcast expenditures have an impact on 
voting.
A study by Volgy and Schwartz in 1980 took a different
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approach than previous research in media campaigning. They 
sought to answer the question regarding which groups within the
voting population are influenced most by television campaigning. 
Research in this area is important for improving media spending 
practices because it allows campaigns to determine better their 
target audience.
Very little is known about what motivates a campaign to
pursue a particular strategy. A study by Hershey, however,
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suggests a theory which should be pursued further. Hershey 
hypothesizes that relative uncertainty about an election outcome 
induces a candidate to work harder in a campaign. Under uncertain 
conditions, she found, political candidates will employ more 
methods of campaigning than in elections where the outcome appears 
to be certain. Hershey suggests that candidates can never be sure 
which campaign technique or combination of techniques are the most 
effective. Although past winners are the experts, they cannot 
afford to rely on a single method of voter contact. The campaign, 
therefore, will use as many types of appeals to the voters as it 
feels it can afford.
Hershey's conclusions draw some important implications for 
research in campaign finance. We have mentioned how candidates 
who appear to be sure winners or sure losers tend to spend less in 
their campaigns than vulnerable incumbents or open-seat candidates 
(refer to Table 3-8 and 3-11). Hershey's model explains this 
phenomenon rather well. In the case of the sure winners or sure 
losers, the outcome is very certain and the candidates in either 
situation are not motivated to campaign with the same vigor as 
candidates running in elections perceived to be close. This
includes performing the fundraising function of the campaign. 
Consequently, the amount of funds raised and spent by the campaign 
may be the result of the relative motivation of the candidate 
which, Hershey argues, is a function of the closeness of the 
election.
SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter has been to review the research 
inquiring into the role of money in elections. The first section 
of this chapter explored the most studied aspect of campaign 
spending: fundraising and the rising cost of campaigning. It was
found that campaign funding sources include individual donors, 
political action committees (PACs), and the political parties. 
Individuals contribute the largest portion of campaign funds by 
far followed by PACs and parties. For the purpose of our research 
it is important to note that total contributions and the costs 
associated with running for office have increased well above the 
rate of inflation for many years. Money, it would seem, has 
become a critical resource for political campaigns.
The second section of this chapter discussed the research 
inquiring into whether overall spending levels determine electoral 
success. For many years, it was believed that presidential 
candidates spending the most during their campaigns won election. 
This belief was discredited when both Franklin Roosevelt and Harry 
Truman won election while spending less that their opponents. 
Recent research has determined, however, that campaign
expenditures, along with incumbency and party strength, may be 
reliable predictors of election outcome. In very close elections, 
campaign spending may be the most significant factor.
Because research has indicated that campaign spending may 
have an impact on election outcome, the final section of this 
chapter attempts to determine how this is possible by focusing on 
internal campaign budgeting patterns. Until 1974, when changes in 
federal election laws required federal campaigns to submit 
detailed financial statements, very little was written about 
congressional campaign budgeting. Since then several studies have 
been published, the most extensive work being produced by 
Goldenberg and Traugott. In their study, Goldenberg and Traugott 
compared the internal spending patterns over time of various 
candidates ranked by their predicted liklihood of success. Among 
their conclusions, they found that most campaign funds (58 
percent) were spent on advertising, suggesting that advertising 
spending is seen as the most important area for campaign funds. 
Contrary to this observation, they found that as much as 23 
percent of all campaign funds were spent on undersignated 
activities, suggesting that campaign professionalization my still 
lag in the lower federal races. Furthermore, they found all 
candidates spent more than 64 percent of their budgets in the 
fourth quarter of the campaign.
The next chapter will present the findings of our research. 
Because Goldenberg and Traugott performed the definitive study for 
current research into internal campaign budgeting patterns, this
study will refer to their conclusions when presenting its 
findings. Special attention will be paid to whether congressional 
campaigns still spend most of their funds on advertising, whether 
a large percentage of funds are spent on undesignated activities, 
and whether campaigns continue to employ a strategy of spending 
most of their money in the final quarter of the campaign year.
NOTES
For a discussion of PAC activities during the 1982 
elections see: Larry J. Sabato, "Parties, PACs, and Interest 
Groups," in The American Elections of 1982, ed., Thomas E. Mann 
and Norman J. Ornstein (Washington: The American Enterprise 
Institute, 1983), pp. 72 - 110.
2
During the period from 1974 to 1980, the total number of 
registered federal PACs quadrupled from 608 to 2551. The largest 
group being the corporate PACs growing in number from 89 to 1204 
followed by trade groups (574 in 1980) and labor organizations 
(378 in 1980) respectively. PAC spending for all congressional 
candidates grew from $8.5 million in 1972 to $58.4 million in 
1980.
3
A second problem stems from a recent Supreme Court ruling 
(Buckley v. Valeo) allowing contributors to exceed contribution 
limits to campaigns by making independent expenditures for 
promoting or advocating the defeat of a candidate without the 
consultation or request of a candidate in the election. For a 
discussion, see: Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of Political
Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections (New York: Basic Books, 
1981), p. 281.
4
One reason why Republican candidates fare better in this 
area of fundraising stems from the advances made in direct mail 
solicitation technology pioneered by the RNC and certain 
conservative think tanks such as The Richard A. Viguerie Company 
(RAVCO). Direct mail fundraising has given the Republicans a 
broad base of financial support nationally and many of the 
contributors on these lists donate repeatedly to various 
Republican candidates at every federal level. For a discussion on 
the uses of direct mail fundraising see: Sabato, Ibid. pp. 220 - 
263.
^Robert J. Huckshorn and Robert C. Spencer, The Politics of 
Defeat: Campaigning for Congress (Boston: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1971), pp. 6-12. Huckshorn and Spencer 
provide a good description of how the targeting process works and 
how candidates have little power over who receives the benefits of 
running in a "marginal" district. Also see: Sabato, "Parties,
PACs and Independent Groups," o p . cit., pp. 90 - 94.
6
Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice 
in Congressional Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1981), p. 40.
95.
^Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 391.
g
David Adaraany, Financing Politics; Recent Wisconsin 
Elections, (Madison, Wis.: The University Of Wisconsin Press, 
1969).
9Ibid., p . 120.
*^Edie N. Goldenberg and Michael W. Traugott, Campaigning 
for Congress, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1984).
^See: Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy, (Durham:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1960) and Herbert E. 
Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election, (Lexington: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1971).
12
Heard, Ibid., p. 16-19. Heard offers a comprehensive 
overview of the literature to 1960 and includes the arguments both 
for and against this original hypothesis.
13
William P. Welch, "The Economics of Campaign Funds," 
Public Choice 20:83-98, 1974 and "The Effectiveness of 
Expenditures in State Legislative Races," American Politics 
Quarterlt 4:333-356, July 1976.
14
Gary C. Jacobson, "Practical Consequences of Campaign 
Finance Reform: An Incumbent Protection Act?" Public Policy 
24:1-31, Fall 1976.
^ J o h n  R. Owens and Edward C. Olson, "Campaign Spending and 
the Electoral rocess in California, 1966 - 1974," Western 
Political Quarterly 30:493-512, 1977.
16
Theodore S. Arrington and Gerald L. Ingalls, "The Effects 
of Campaign Spending on Local Elections," American Politics 
Quarterly 12:117-127, January 1984.
^Jonathan Silberman, "A Comment on the Economics of 
Campaign Funds," Public Choice 25:69-74, 1976.
18
Jonathan Silberman and Gilbert Yochum, "The Role of Money 
in Determining Election Outcomes," Social Science Quarterly 
58:671-682, 1978. Silberman and Yochum use a quadratic formula 
based on Jacobson's original model reaching an R value of 68 
percent. They compare candidates in three categories 
(challengers, first and second term incumbents and incumbents with 
more than two terms) and by party on the basis of their marginal 
change in percentage of vote associated with increases in campaign 
expenditures.
96.
William P. Welch, "Money and Votes: A Simultaneous 
Equation Model," Public Choice 26:209-234, 1981.
20
Stanton A. Glantz, Alan I. Abramowitz and Michael 
Burkart, "Election Outcomes: Whose Money Matters?" Journal of 
Politics 38:1033-1038, 1976.
21Ibid., pp. 1037-1038.
22
Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in 
Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review 
72:469-491, 1978. Jacobson uses a two-stage least squares 
regression analysis on 1972-1974 election data. The difference in 
spending levels by incumbents is negatively correlated (-.58) with 
the difference in the proportion of the vote won. A significant 
relationship remains even when the change in challenger spending 
is taken into account —  particularly in congressional elections.
23Ibid. p. 491.
24
Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 48 - 50.
25
Paul A. Dawson and James E. Zinser, "Broadcast 
Expenditures and Electoral Outcomes in the 1970 Congressional 
Elections," Public Opinion Quarterly 35:398 - 402, Fall 1971.
26
Kristian S. Palda, "Does Advertising Influence Votes? An 
Analysis of the 1966 and 1970 Quebec Elections," Canadian Journal 
of Political Science 6:639 - 655, 1973.
27
Gary C. Jacobson, "The Impacts of Broadcast Campaigning 
on Electoral Outcomes," Journal of Politics 37:769 -793, 1975.
28
Thomas J. Volgy and John E. Schwartz, "On Television 
Viewing and Citizens" Political Attitudes, Activity, and 
Knowledge: Another Look at the Impact of Media on Politics," 
Western Political Quarterly 33:2:153 - 166, June 1980.
29
Marjorie Randon Hershey, The Making of Campaign Strategy, 
(Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heathand Company, 1974), pp. 23 - 28.
CHAPTER IV
SPENDING PATTERNS FOR COMPETITIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
Our purpose in this paper is to inquire into the relationship 
between campaign budgeting decisions and success in congressional 
elections. Specifically, we are concerned with how budgeting 
decisions are affected by fundraising expectations and whether 
this makes a difference in campaign success. Underlying this 
thesis is the assumption that campaign budgets reflect the basic 
strategy pursued by political campaigns. For argument sake, it is 
assumed that campaigns raising significant sums of money early in 
the election cycle are more successful because they are able to 
budget their resources better and can pursue a winning strategy.
In order to control this experiment, only certain elections 
will be examined. We will look at congressional races rated too 
close to predict by the editors of the Congressional Quarterly 
prior to election day. By selecting close elections, we hope to 
see campaigns where the impact of budgeting strategy is the key 
element to success. The data sample will be extended over the 
1982 and 1984 election cycles to avoid external influences such as 
the "surge and decline" effect discussed in chapter one.
Because the sample set of this study will be very small, no 
attempt will be made to apply a statistical analysis to the data 
other than comparing actual average dollars. The purpose here 
will be to make general observations and provide a point of 
reference for future research. Specifically, this thesis will 
compare successful campaigns with unsuccessful campaigns over time 
using a two step approach. First, the flow of contributions into 
the campaigns will be examined. Second, the flow of contributions 
will be compared to the budgeting patterns of each case over time. 
Special attention will be paid to the relationship between media 
expenditures and the inflow of contributions. It is hypothesized 
that media expenditures will begin later in campaigns where 
fundraising is moving slowly and these campaigns will more often 
be losing efforts. Special attention will be paid to spending for 
polling. It is hypothesized that campaigns spending too little 
for polling, in most cases, will not be successful because 
incomplete information is used to develop the campaign message.
METHODOLOGY
Selection of the Sample
Past research indicates that campaign spending is one of 
several significant factors affecting congressional election 
outcomes. Other factors include incumbency and the "surge and 
decline" effect associated with presidential campaigns. This
research differs from past studies by examining only the elections 
predicted to be close. By viewing only competitive races, it is 
hoped that the influences of these other variables will be
minimized and that the cases in this study clearly demonstrate how
campaign funding and budget preferences can make the difference in 
the election outcome.
The selection of the campaigns for the data sample was based 
on the fact that the Congressional Quarterly considered their 
outcome unpredictable. Congressional Quarterly was chosen as the 
expert source for predicting election outcomes because it is one 
of very few scholarly publications devoted to congress which is 
commonly recognized as an impartial, nonpartisan source of 
information.
Appendices A and B list the campaigns used in the sample:
Appendix A listing eleven 1982 congressional races and Appendix B
list five 1984 races.In their pre-election day issues of 1982 and 
1984, the Congressional Quarterly listed each of these contests 
as having "no clear favorite."^ In all cases, two challengers 
were vying for the same seat. As mentioned previously, 1982 and 
1984 elections were used to compare campaigns in both the surge 
and decline situations resulting from having the president on and 
off the election ballot.
As earlier research suggests, most congressional campaigns 
are not competitive. Incumbents, for instance, tend to be 
reelected at an overwhelming rate. Because our data sample 
includes only competitive campaigns, we are excluding the majority
of congressional elections being decided during the time of our 
study. Consequently, there are some differences between our data 
sample and the universe of congressional elections which must be 
addressed. For instance, it is expected that the average level of 
total spending will be higher for our sample than for all other 
races. The reason for this stems from the perception of campaign 
donors that most races are unwinnable and therefore, should not be 
supported financially. Furthermore, because the races in our 
samplee will have larger budgets, they will be able to use the 
most current technologies and spend larger amounts in each area 
such as radio and television.
Data Collection
Campaign financial records were collected from periodic 
statements issued by the campaigns to the Federal Election 
Cominmission (FEC). By law, congressional campaigns must submit 
reports of their contributions and disbursements to the FEC. 
Reports are due quarterly, prior to a primary or general election, 
and after a primary or general election.
Schedule B of the standard FEC report form is used to list 
all disbursements. These entries are listed usually in 
chronological order, similar to the to the type of entry an 
individual would make for a checking account transaction. 
Naturally, the time spent sorting through these entries, assigning 
them to specific campaign accounts, and compiling their totals 
was one of the major hurdles of our research. Appendix C
describes how these transactions were assigned to specific 
campaign accounts.
Finally, because the data are compared over time, quarterly 
periods were used during the general election year. Often, 
periods were combined to ensure that the quarterly totals were 
consistant with every campaign. The quarters ran as follows: 
first quarter (January 1 through March 31), second quarter (April 
1 through June 30), third quarter (July 1 through September 31), 
fourth quarter 1982 (October 1 through November 22), and the 
fourth quarter 1984 (October 1 through November 25).
FINDINGS
Before examining the fundraising and campaign expenditures of 
the data sample, some of the basic facts about the races used in 
this study will be reviewed. One external factor which cannot be 
overlooked is the "surge and decline effect." As indicated 
earlier, there were fewer congressional races considered 
unpredictable during the 1984 elections than during 1982. The 
reason, as was discussed, is that President Reagan was running for 
reelection during 1984 and his campaign focused public attention 
toward all campaigns much earlier in the election cycle. Table 
4-1 demonstrates tha powerful impact of having the president run 
for reelection: every Republican in our 1984 group won election
to Congress. In 1982, on the other hand, campaign victory was
TABLE 4-1
SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNS IN THE RESEARCH SAMPLE BY PARTY
(1982 and 1984)
1982 1984
Democrats 5 0
Republicans 6 5
(N=ll) (N=5)
SOURCE: Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American
Politics, 1986, (Washington: The National Journal).
less certain since both parties shared almost equally in winning 
seats•
Although Republicans won every election in our 1984 sample, 
this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the surge of 
support for President Reagan swept all of these candidates into 
office. As Table 4-2 indicates, winning campaigns in both 1982 
and 1984 raised more in total contributions than their 
competition. Consequently, it could be concluded that higher 
contributions and voter surge contributed to the success of the 
1984 Republican candidates. In the absence of a presidential 
candidate, as in 1982, higher contributions may contribute to 
electoral success for congressional candidates.
The data in Table 4-2 also supports the findings of previous 
research. The Democrats, on average, were outspent by the 
Republicans in both election years. Also, the cost of campaigning 
for Congress continued to rise. In 1984, unsuccessful candidates 
raised, on average, more funds that successful candidates in the 
previous election. This fact supports the wisdom of humorist Will 
Rogers who said: "Politics has become so expensive that it takes
lots of money to even get beat with."
Comparison of Fundraising Over Time
Tables 4-3 and 4-4 compare the fundraising sources of 
successful and unsuccessful campaigns over time for 1982 and 1984 
respectively. Once again, the data support the findings of past 
research. In all cases, individuals provided the largest share of
TABLE 4-2
AVERAGE TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES 
IN THE RESEARCH SAMPLE 
(1982 and 1984)
1982 1984
Winners
Losers
$420,344
(N=ll)
$330,808
(N-ll)
$542,132
(N=5)
$465,026
(N=5)
Democrats $308,819 $465,026
(N=ll) (N=5)
Republicans $416,067 $542,132
(N-ll) (N-5)
SOURCE: Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American
Politics, 1986, (Washington: The National Journal).
TABLE 4-3
FUNDRAISING SOURCES OVER TIME FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES
FROM THE RESEARCH SAMPLE
(Actual Average Dollars Raised for General Election Year 1982)
Successful Campaigns (N=ll)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Individuals
(%)
$22,799 $26,613 $40,817 $54,404 $144,633
(57.0%)
PACs
(%)
4,450 10,832 22,223 53,534 91,039
(35.9%)
Party
(%)
600 3,149 3,339 10,824 17,912
(7.1%)
Total
(%)
$27,849
(11.0%)
$40,594
(16.0%)
$66,379
(26.2%)
$118,762
(46.8%)
$253,584
(100.0%)
Unsuccessful Campaigns (N= 11)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Individuals
(%)
$16,638 $24,446 $44,698 $44,330 $130,112
(48.0%)
PACs
(%)
1,521 6,179 47,580 63,007 118,287
(43.6%)
Party
(%)
1,250 4,738 6,833 10,086 22,907
(8.4%)
Total
(%)
$19,409
(7.2%)
$35,363
(13.0%)
$99,111
(36.5%)
$117,423
(43.3%)
$271,306
(100.0%)
TABLE 4-4
FUNDRAISING SOURCES OVER TIME FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES
FROM THE RESEARCH SAMPLE
(Actual Average Dollars Raised for General Election Year 1984)
Successful Campaigns (N=5)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Individuals
(%)
$34,560 $53,210 $68,083 $80,846 $236,699
(52.7%)
PACs
(%)
5,835 11,946 66,960 107,755 192,496
(42.8%)
Party
(%)
100 2,350 11,951 5,903 20,304
(4.5%)
Total
(%)
$40,495
(9.0%)
$67,506
(15.0%)
$146,994
(32.7%)
$194,504
(43.3%)
$449,499
(100.0%)
Unsuccessful Campaigns (N=5)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Individuals
(%)
$40,825 $42,454 $60,911 $75,107 $219,297
(62.3%)
PACs
(%)
4,938 15,196 26,386 73,445 119,965
(34.1%)
Party
(%)
0 1,139 4,137 7,344 12,620
(3.6%)
Total
(%)
$45,763
(13.0%)
$58,789
(16.7%)
$91,434
(26.0%)
$155,896
(44.3%)
$351,882
(100.0%)
support for congressional candidates followed closely by PAC 
contributions. Party contributions provide less than ten percent 
of total campaign funding for all cases.
The timing of contributions is the issue of chief importance 
to this research. On average, every campaign type in the study 
received contributions from all sources at an increasing rate over 
time. Surprisingly, the unsuccessful campaigns in 1982 received 
more contributions by the end of the third quarter than their 
competition. In 1984, however, the trend was reversed 
dramatically. This suggests that electoral success may not depend 
on raising more funds sooner than your opponent.
The fact remains, however, that the fourth quarter tends to 
be the most successful fund raising period. In the data sample of 
races, anywhere from 43 to 46 percent of every campaign budget was 
raised in the fourth quarter. Without question, this makes 
campaign planning and budgeting a very difficult task at best. 
Consequently, the role of campaign experience (or the use of a 
good consultant where experience is lacking) may be the factor 
which leads campaigns to make the best possible budgetary 
decisions.
Comparison of General Spending Patterns
Tables 4-5 through 4-8 present a breakdown of the average 
expenditures over time for every campaign type in our sample.
When examined as an entire group, our results are consistent with 
previous research. The mean total expenditures over time
108.
TABLE 4-5
AVERAGE EXPENDITURES OVER TIME FOR SUCCESSFUL HOUSE CANDIDATES
FROM THE 1982 RESEARCH SAMPLE
(Actual Average Dollars Spent for General Election Year)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Staff/Travel $6,798 $8,171 $15,642 $23,041 $53,652
(15.1%)
Office 2,701 5,204 8,738 10,026 26,669
(7.5%)
Advertising 14,595 30,159 68,010 126,807 239,571
(67.3%)
Polling 2,400 3,658 1,955 1,178 9,191
(2.6%)
Consultant 3,523 1,043 3,232 3,766 11,564
(3.2%)
Other 843 1,718 2,478 10,397 15,436
(4.3%)
Total $30,860 $49,953 $100,055 $175,215 $356,083
(%) (8.7%) (14.0%) (28.1%) (49.2%) (100.0%)
( N - l l )
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TABLE 4-6
AVERAGE EXPENDITURES OVER TIME FOR UNSUCCESSFUL HOUSE CANDIDATES
FROM THE 1982 RESEARCH SAMPLE
(Actual Average Dollars Spent for General Election Year)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Staff/Travel $6,057 $11,272 $21,027 $25,639 $63,995
(21.6%)
Office 2,186 4,567 9,377 8,325 24,455
(8.3%)
Advertising 13,878 19,350 56,772 84,579 174,579
(59.0%)
Polling 9 668 3,110 3,321 7,108
(2.4%)
Consultant 1,674 5,519 4,020 3,084 14,297
(4.8%)
Other 1,369 2,432 2,097 5,620 11,518
(3.9%)
Total $25,173 $43,808 $96,403 $130,568 $295,952
(%) (8.5%) (14.8%) (32.6%) (44.1%) (100.0%)
(N=11)
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TABLE 4-7
AVERAGE EXPENDITURES OVER TIME FOR SUCCESSFUL HOUSE CANDIDATES
FROM THE 1984 RESEARCH SAMPLE
(Actual Average Dollars Spent for General Election Year)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Staff/Travel $5,117 $12,675 $30,531 $27,261 $75,584
(16.8%)
Office 3,992 9,261 16,553 13,167 42,973
(9.5%)
Advertising 14,369 38,276 63,410 153,123 269,178
(59.7%)
Polling 9,271 8,138 6,385 4,928 28,722
(6.4%)
Consultant 3,010 2,583 5,979 3,978 15,550
(3.4%)
Other 474 4,192 3,167 11,164 18,997
(4.2%)
Total $36,233 $75,125 $126,025 $213,621 $451,004
(%) (8.0%) (16.7%) (27.9%) (47.4%) (100.0%)
(N=5)
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TABLE 4-8
AVERAGE EXPENDITURES OVER TIME FOR UNSUCCESSFUL HOUSE CANDIDATES
FROM THE 1984 RESEARCH SAMPLE
(Actual Average Dollars Spent for General Election Year)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Staff/Travel $734 $3,615 $15,085 $6,760 $26,194
(7.1%)
Office 5,850 4,702 10,751 20,793 42,096
(11.3%)
Advertising 25,726 33,219 53,019 150,684 262,648
(70.8%)
Polling 1,063 2,991 7,035 2,602 13,691
(3.7%)
Consultant 2,440 1,620 1,958 5,707 11,725
(3.2%)
Other 859 2,068 4,782 7,019 14,728
(4.0%)
Total $36,672 $48,215 $92,630 $193,565 $371,082
(%) (9.9%) (13.0%) (25.0%) (52.2%) (100.0%)
(N=5)
increases for all campaigns and usually reflects the increases on 
the fundraising side. Nearly half of all campaign funds are spent 
during the fourth quarter and nearly three-fourths of all funds 
are spent during the last two quarters.
Fundraising appears to be a key indicator of how quickly 
campaign funds are spent. Although all campaigns increased their 
spending with time, successful candidates increased their spending 
at a higher rate than unsuccessful candidates. This phenomenon 
may be the result of the successful candidate raising more money 
in less time than their competition.
The fact that successful candidates spent more money than 
unsuccessful candidates, however, does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that higher spending (and therefore better fundraising) 
leads to electoral success. Rather, it is important to examine 
where this money was spent and how it may contribute to their 
success.
Looking at the internal budgeting patterns of our entire 
sample, our findings are consistent with the research performed by 
Goldenberg and Traugott. This study differs from theirs in two 
basic ways: we examined only competitive races and our funding 
categories were combined into fewer groups. Like the candidates 
in their study tagged as "hopefuls," the campaigns in this study 
spent about two-thirds of their budgets on advertising, followed 
by staff and travel, office expenses, research, and "other." The 
budgeting patterns of nearly all of the campaign types fell within 
a reasonable range of the spending patterns observed by Goldenberg
and Traugott. This suggests that there is little difference in 
the ways that campaigns budget their overall research over time 
(our percentages run slightly higher than the findings of 
Goldenberg and Traugott because our data included only funds 
expended during the election year).
Unlike Goldenberg and Traugott, this study included separate 
categories for general consulting expenses and polling and 
research. As mentioned previously, general campaign consultants 
are most important for candidates with little congresional 
campaign experience. Because the data includes only candidates 
running for their first term, probably most of our candidates 
suffer from inexperience. Accurate polling, on the other hand, is 
necessary to enable the campaign to develope a message in tune 
with the minds of the voters and to make adjustments in the 
campaign media presentation.
As predicted in the introduction, successful campaigns in 
both election years outspent their competition for polling (both 
in percentage of theirr total budgets and in actual dollars). In 
1984, successful campaigns doubled their polling expenditures over 
the unsuccessful campaigns. Keeping in mind that presidential 
surge may have contributed to the success of every Republican, it 
cannot be concluded that higher spending for polling leads to 
electoral success, but rather that accurate polling (as measured 
by higher spending in this case) may be a factor contributing to 
success in close elections. Further research is recommended on 
the importance of polling in congressional elction victories.
As mentioned, general consulting services may provide 
inexperienced candidates with the necessary information and 
guidance to be successful. In the research sample, very few 
campaigns did not employ a general consultant at some pointt 
during the election year which supports the assertion that 
campaigning is becoming increasingly professional. Surprisingly, 
unsuccessful candidates int he 1982 spent more for consultants 
than did their competition. The reverse is true in 1984. 
Consequently, is concluded that for these two elections, general 
consulting services did not have a strong impact on the outcome.
Comparison of Media Spending Patterns
As discussed previously, advertising expenditures are by far 
the single largest item in congressional campaign budgets. This 
seems logical since the business of a congressional campaign is to 
present the candidate and the campaign message to the voting 
public. The question which remains concerns how campaign funds 
are best spent within the advertising/media budget.
Once again, we turn to Goldenberg and Traugott for comparison 
since their research is the first in this area of study and our 
approach is very similar to theirs. In their analysis, Goldenberg 
and Traugott examined media budgets for open-seat congressional 
campaigns during 1978. They found that the combined spending for 
television and radio represented the the largest account at 32.8 
percent of the average media budget. This was followed by printed
material (31.3 percent) and undesignated activities including 
photographs and movies (27.9 percent). Newspaper and outdoor 
advertising represented less than ten percent of this budget. 
Goldenberg and Traugott did not make any indication whether this 
budgeting pattern led to electoral success nor how these funds 
were spent over time.
The remaining tables in this thesis, Tables 4-9 through 4-12, 
provide a breakdown of the average advertising expenditures over 
time for successful and unsuccessful congressional candidates in 
1982 and 1984. For the data sample as a whole, our findings 
reflect the conclusions drawn by Goldenberg and Traugott: 
television and radio are the largest single budget item followed 
by direct mail (includes all printed material) with newspaper and 
outdoor media expenditures totalling less than ten percent.
The most noticeable difference between our findings and the 
findings of Goldenberg and Traugott are that while they found 
television and radio totalled 32.8 percent followed closely by 
undesignated activities, our research indicated television and 
radio expenditures range in the upper sixtieth percent of the 
total media budget and undesignated activities less than five 
percent. This finding demonstrates a dramatic change in campaign 
budgeting preferences since 1978. Whereas television and radio 
expenditures were considered important in 1978, these media have 
become more critical to campaigns in recent years.
Caution must be added to this finding. Goldenberg and 
Traugott never indicated how they classified budget items such as
116.
TABLE 4-9
AVERAGE ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES OVER TIME 
FOR SUCCESSFUL HOUSE CANDIDATES 
FROM THE 1982 RESEARCH SAMPLE 
(Actual Average Dollars Spent for General Election Year)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Direct Mail $3,925 $4,658 $11,230 $20,633 $40,446
(16.9%)
TV & Radio 7,052 20,601 46,824 95,366 169,843
(70.9%)
Newspaper 168 308 523 3,984 4,983
(2.1%)
Outdoor 1,641 2,597 6,394 3,710 14,342
(6.0%)
Undesignated 1,809 1,995 3,039 3,114 9,957
(4.2%)
Total $14,595 $30,159 $68,010 $126,807 $239,571
<%) (6.1%) (12.6%) (28.4%) (52.9%) (100.0%)
(N=ll)
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TABLE 4-10
AVERAGE ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES OVER TIME 
FOR UNSUCCESSFUL HOUSE CANDIDATES 
FROM THE 1982 RESEARCH SAMPLE 
(Actual Average Dollars Spent for General Election Year)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Direct Mail $2,501 $7,419 $18,456 $19,508 $47,884
(27.4%)
TV & Radio 9,217 7,014 31,586 59,462 107,279
(61.5%)
Newspaper 0 268 461 1,702 2,431
(1.4%)
Outdoor 2,093 2,911 3,694 2,449 11,147
(6.4%)
Undesignated 67 1,738 2,566 1,458 5,829
(3.3%)
Total $13,878 $19,350 $56,763 $84,579 $174,570
(%) (7.9%) (11.1%) (32.5%) (48.4%) (100.0%)
(N-11)
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TABLE 4-11
AVERAGE ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES OVER TIME 
FOR SUCCESSFUL HOUSE CANDIDATES 
FROM THE 1984 RESEARCH SAMPLE 
(Actual Average Dollars Spent for General Election Year)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Direct Mail $3,819 $14,095 $17,562 $21,994 $57,470
(21.4%)
TV & Radio 9,513 19,932 36,536 120,757 186,738
(69.4%)
Newspaper 0 881 686 4,905 6,472
(2.4%)
Outdoor 660 2,395 5,107 2,942 11,104
(4.1%)
Undesignated 377 973 3,519 2,525 7,394
(2.7%)
Total $14,369 $38,276 $63,410 $153,123 $269,178
(%) (5.3%) (14.2%) (23.6%) (56.9%) (100.0%)
(N=5)
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TABLE 4-12
AVERAGE ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES OVER TIME 
FOR UNSUCCESSFUL HOUSE CANDIDATES 
FROM THE 1984 RESEARCH SAMPLE 
(Actual Average Dollars Spent for General Election Year)
Quarter 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Direct Mail $2,459 $4,177 $13,142 $25,473 $45,251
(17.2%)
TV & Radio 17,693 19,717 35,326 110,506 183,242
(69.8%)
Newspaper 401 2,734 1,971 10,457 15,563
(5.9%)
Outdoor 5,071 4,178 2,021 2,346 13,616
(5.2%)
Undesignated 102 2,413 559 1,902 4,976
(1.9%)
Total $25,726 $33,219 $53,019 $150,684 $262,648
(%) (9.8%) (12.6%) (20.2%) (57.4%) (100.0%)
(N=5)
media consultant expenses. In this study, this expense is 
included as part of total radio and television expenditures which 
may inflate our figures slightly over what Goldenberg and Traugott 
may have found under similar circumstances. The difference 
between the findings of this study and the findings Goldenberg and 
Traugott found in 1978, however, clearly indicates television and 
radio have become increasingly important media for congressional 
campaigns.
In the data sample, very little difference is observed 
between winning campaigns and losing campaigns in overall media 
spending patterns: each campaign type spends similar amouunts in 
each of the budgeting categories. As mentioned previously, all 
successful campaigns, on average, spent more money on their entire 
media budgets than losing campaigns. In 1982, this holds true for 
each of the budgeting categories with the exception of direct 
mail. In this election year, unsuccessful candidates were clearly 
outspent on television and radio, but made up the difference in 
direct mail. One possible conclusion that could be drawn would be 
that media dollars spent on television and radio are more 
effective in moving voters than direct mail. This hypothesis 
cannot be disproved in 1984 since successful campaigns spent more 
than unsuccessful campaigns in both of these areas.
Another conclusion which may be drawn from the 1984 data is 
that higher campaign expenditures for outdoor and newspaper 
advertising may not effectively move voters. In 1984, 
unsuccessful campaigns outspent their competition in these areas
while remaining competitive in radio and television spending. It 
is important to keep in mind, however, that presidential surge may 
have distorted the electoral impact of these media campaigns and 
that this hypothesis cannot be conclusive. Therefore, it is 
recoramende that this study be replicated over several elections 
before these conclusions can be supported.
Like the overall budgeting patterns of our campaigns, most 
campaigns in our sample increased spending in each of its media 
accounts over time. Outdoor and undesignated activities tend to 
break from this trend. For outdoor advertising, this seems 
logical because billboard purchases (a major ingredient of outdoor 
media) are made usually just once while the use of the billboard 
extends through the entire campaign.
All other media devices (direct mail, television and radio, 
and newspapers) tend to increase over time. Like most other 
campaign spending patterns, half of the expenditures made in these 
areas occur during the fourth quarter of the campaign year. There 
is no essential difference between winning and losing campaigns in 
our sample regarding spending patterns over time.
SUMMARY
This chapter presented the methodology used in this study and 
the research findings. The objective of this study has been to 
compare the fundraising and spending patterns over time of 
competitive congressional elections to determine whether campaign 
budgeting preferences influence election outcome.
The data consisted of financial reports submitted to the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) by our selected campaigns. The 
research sample included campaigns from both 1982 and 1984 
election years to account for the possible impact of having a 
presidential election during one of the congressional elections.
To avoid the influence of incumbency, all of the candidates in our 
sample were running for their first term. Because the purpose of 
this study was to examine races where campaign spending could 
influence election outcome, the sample consisted of competitive 
races. Specifically, congressional elections considered too close 
to predict by the Congressional Quarterly, a nonpartisan 
publication, were examined.
Although the effects of incumbency were successfully 
eliminated from our data sample, the influences of the 
presidential elections affected our data sample dramatically.
Fewer campaigns qualified for our 1984 sample than in 1982 because 
fewer were considered competitive. Furthermore, the congressional 
candidates from the presidents party won election in every case 
in 1984. The 1982 elections, on the other hand, provided more
close races for our sample and the number of successful campaigns 
were evenly split between the Democrats and Republicans.
Successful candidates, we found, differ from their 
competition by having, on average, larger total budgets. However, 
it was found that there is very little difference between the 
internal spending patterns over time for successful and 
unsuccesssful campaigns. Like campaign fundraising, campaign 
expenditure activity is very slow in the early stages of the 
campaignand is concentrated in the fourth quarter of the election 
year. Nearly half of all expenditures are spent during the final 
quarter of the election year, suggesting that campaign budgeting 
depends heavily on fundraising and, therefore, is a difficult task 
for campaign managers.
The one exceptional difference between successful and 
unsuccessful campaigns involves the use of opinion polling. 
Although successful candidates tend to outspend their competition 
in every area, the difference is more dramatic in the area of 
opinion polling. This study could not determine whether higher 
spending for opinion polling led to electoral success, but opinion 
polling and better information in general would allow campaigns to 
make better strategic decisions. It is recommended that the 
significance of this finding be explored by further research.
Advertising expenditures are, on average, the single largest 
budget item for all candidates. Most advertising funds are spent 
on radio and television followed by direct mail and printing.
When compared to the findings of Goldenberg and Traugott, it was 
found that our sample group spent more funds, both in total 
dollars and as a budget percentage, on radio and television 
advertising than past campaigns. This finding is evidence that 
campaign professionalization has increased at the congressional 
level.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The objective of this study has been to compare the 
fundraising and spending patterns over time of competitive 
congressional elections to determine whether campaign budgeting 
preferences influence election outcome. In this chapter, we will 
summarize the research findings and draw conclusions.
This sstudy began with a review of past research inquiring 
into the factors contributing to electoral success. In the first 
chapter, it was found that current congressional election theory 
relies on the impact of incumbency to explain most electoral 
patterns. The advantages incumbents enjoy can be traced to some 
very real characteristics of holding office including: better name 
recognition, subsidized office support, and an increased 
inclination among voters to choose incumbents. Furthermore, it 
was argued that incumbents have become more effective in employing 
these advantages for electoral purposes since their reelection 
rates now often exceed 90 percent.
The other major factors discussed in chapter one affecting 
congressional election patterns include: party affiliation, 
presidential elections, and the state of the economy. Research 
indicates that these three interrelated variables may explain the
aggregate election phenomenon of "surge and decline." Put 
briefly, congressional candidates running in the party of a 
successful presidential candidate tend to win election. This 
further adds to the argument that congressional campaigns tend to 
be uncompetitive. When examined on a district by district basis, 
however, the "surge and decline" effect fails to predict who will 
win in a particular congressional district, especially when a race 
is rated as competitive by both sides. Consequently, it was 
concluded that this study must explore the impact of campaign 
technology and campaign spending on election outcomes as possible 
factors explaining this gap in congressional election theory.
The second chapter provided an overview of the various 
technologies available to congressional campaigns and how they 
have been used by past campaigns. Initially, the argument was 
presented that political campaigning has become increasingly 
professionalized; that the use of radio and television, opinion 
polling, and direct mail and phone banks have replaced the party 
apparatus of earlier campaigns. Until recently, it has been 
difficult to study which technological strategies are employed by 
campaigns and whether any particular approach is more successful 
than another. Furthermore, research inquiring into which 
strategies lead to electoral success is virtually nonexistent.
Since campaign technologies cannot be used without campaign 
funds, the answer to determining campaign strategy and success may 
lie in an examination of campaign budgeting preferences. The 
third chapter reviewed past studies of money in politics beginning
with a broad overview of campaign finance and concluding with a 
review of congressional campaign budget preference research. The 
first section of this chapter explored the most studied aspect of 
campaign spending: fundraising and the rising cost of
campaigning. It was found that campaign funding sources include 
individual donors, political action committees (PACs), and the 
political parties. Individuals contribute the largest portion of 
campaign funds by far followed by PACs and parties. Total 
contributions and the costs associated with running for office 
have increased well above the rate of inflation in recent years.
The second section of this chapter examined whether overall 
spending levels determine electoral success. For many years, it 
was believed that presidential candidates spending the most during 
their campaigns won election. This belief was discredited when 
both Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman won election while 
spending less that their opponents. Recent research has 
determined, however, that campaign expenditures, along with 
incumbency and party strength, may be reliable predictors of 
election outcome. In very close open seat elections, campaign 
spending may be the most significant factor.
The final section of this chapter attempts to determine how 
campaign funds affect election outcomes by examining internal 
campaign budgeting patterns. Until 1974, when changes in federal 
election laws required federal campaigns to submit detailed 
financial statements, very little was known or written about 
congressional campaign budgeting. Since then, several studies
have been published, the most extensive work being produced by 
Goldenberg and Traugott. In their study, Goldenberg and Traugott 
compared the internal spending patterns over time of various 
candidates ranked by their predicted likelihood of success. Among 
their conclusions, they found that most campaign funds (58 
percent) were spent on advertising, suggesting that advertising is 
seen as the most important area for campaign funds. Contrary to 
this observation, they found that as much as 23 percent of all 
campaign funds were spent on undesignated activities, suggesting 
that campaign professionalization may still lag in the lower 
federal races. Furthermore, they found all candidates spent more 
than 64 percent of their budgets in the fourth quarter of the 
campaign.
The fourth chapter presents the findings of this study. 
Because Goldenberg and Traugott performed the definitive study for 
current research into internal campaign budgeting patterns, this 
thesis was patterned on their model. Special attention was paid 
to whether congressional campaigns still spent most of their funds 
on advertising and whether congressional campaigns continue to 
employ a strategy of spending most of their money in the final 
stages of the campaign.
The data sample was collected from the financial reports 
submitted to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) by the 
campaigns selected for the study. Because the purpose here was to 
examine races where campaign spending could influence election 
outcome, the data sample consisted of competitive races.
Specifically, this study examined congressional elections 
considered too close to predict by the Congressional Quarterly, a 
nonpartisan publication. The campaigns in the data sample 
included races from both 1982 and 1984 election years. This was 
done to account for the impact of the "surge and decline" effect. 
All of the candidates in the sample were running for their first 
terms thereby eliminating the effect of incumbency.
Although the role of incumbency was successfully eliminated 
from the data sample, the cases were affected dramatically by the 
influences of the presidential elections. Fewer were considered 
competitive in 1984 than in 1982 and, therefore, fewer campaigns 
qualified for the 1984 sample. Furthermore, every congressional 
candidate from the president's party won election in 1984. The 
1982 elections, on the other hand, provided more close races for 
the sample and the number of successful campaigns were evenly 
split between the Democrats and Republicans. This clearly 
reflects the "surge and decline" effect associated with the 
reelection of a popular presidential candidate.
Successful candidates, it was found, differ from their 
competition by having, on average, larger total budgets. However, 
there is very little difference between the internal spending 
patterns over time for successful and unsuccesssful campaigns.
Like campaign fundraising, campaign expenditure activity is very 
slow in the early stages of the campaign and is concentrated in 
the fourth quarter of the election year. Nearly half of all 
expenditures are spent during the final quarter of the election
year, suggesting that campaign budgeting depends heavily on 
fundraising. This makes the task of projecting campaign budgets 
difficult for campaign managers.
One exceptional difference was observed between successful 
and unsuccessful campaigns in the area of spending for opinion 
polling. Successful candidates clearly outspent their competition 
in the area of opinion polling. This study could not determine 
whether higher spending for opinion polling led to electoral 
success, but opinion polling and better information in general 
would allow campaigns to make better strategic decisions. Further 
research may draw stronger conclusions regarding the significance 
of this finding.
This study was consistent with past research showing 
advertising expenditures are, on average, the single largest 
budget item for all candidates. Most advertising funds are spent 
on radio and television followed by direct mail and printing.
When compared to the findings of Goldenberg and Traugott, the 
sample group spent more funds, both in total dollars and as a 
budget percentage, on radio and television advertising than past 
campaigns, suggesting that campaign professionalization has 
increased at the congressional level since their research.
Money is a critical resource for open seat congressional 
campaigns. Because professional technologies are more widely used 
in the congressional campaign arena, financial contributions are 
essential for candidates running credible campaigns. This is 
especially true for candidates who are not well known by the
voting public such as challengers and candidates running for a 
first term. In very few case, however, can money alone win an 
election. Other factors such as the presence of an incumbent in 
the race or a popular presidential candidate on the ballot 
eliminates most congressional candidates from serious 
consideration by potential donors and the voters.
Given similiar circumstances between two candidates in a 
competitive race, campaign spending can make a difference, 
especially if a campaign fails to budget its resources properly. 
Most campaigns seldom reach the stage of being competitive and, 
therefore, do not raise the funds necessary to run a credible 
race. The campaigns in this study were already successful because 
they were considered competitive. It was found that these 
campaigns budgeted their funds in a very similar manner. Assuming 
that the majority of these campaigns have made, in the past, 
correct budgetary decisions, campaigns straying from this norm 
would run the risk of defeat. Therefore, spending large sums of 
money on advertising in the final stages of the campaign is 
probably the best budgeting decision possible. Furthermore, 
because winning campaigns in competitive races spent more on 
opinion polling, good polling information may be critical to to 
electoral succcess.
APPENDIX A
1982 CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS USED IN RESEARCH SAMPLE 
District Candidate Funds Raised Vote(%)
Arizona-05 Jim McNulty (D) 
Jim Kolbe (R)*
$343,318
532,588
48%
50%
Florida-09 George H. Sheldon (D) 
Nichael Bilirakis (R)*
$379,692
299,558
49%
51%
Kansas-02 Jim Slattery (D)* 
Morris Kay (R)
$263,873
312,459
57%
43%
Maine-01 John M. Kerry (D)
John R. McKernan (R)*
$288,924
384,594
48%
50%
MISS.-02 Robert G. Clark (D) 
Webb Franklin (R)*
$208,136
318,376
48%
50%
Nevada-02 Mary Gojack (D)
Barbara Vucanavich (R)*
$248,865
604,624
41%
56%
Oregon-02 Larryann Willis (D) 
Robert F. Smith (R)*
$225,762
492,808
44%
56%
Texas-16 Ronald D. Coleman (D)* 
Patrick B. Haggerty (R)
$374,821
318,180
54%
44%
Texas-26 Tom Vandergriff (D)* 
Jim Bradshaw (R)
$948,024
516,781
50%
50%
Virginia-06 James R. Olin (D)* 
Kevin G. Miller (R)
$245,708
260,976
50%
49%
West VA.-02 Harley 0. Staggers (D)* 
J. D. Hinkle, Jr. (R)
$158,806
535,796
64%
36%
* indicates winner 
Total of all funds raised during the primary and general 
elections.
SOURCE: Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa,The Almanac of American
Politics, 1986, (Washington: The National Journal).
APPENDIX B
1984 CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS USED IN RESEARCH SAMPLE 
District Candidate Funds Raised3 Vote(%)
Alabama-01 Frank McRight (D)
H. L. Callahan (R)*
$582,198
554,557
49%
51%
Kansas-03 John E. Reardon (D) 
Jan Meyers (R)*
$273,950
442,459
40%
55%
New York-20 Oren J. Teicher (D) 
Joseph D.DioGuardi (R)*
$433,059
644,128
48%
50%
N. C.-09 D. G. Martin (D)
J. A. McMillan, III (R)*
$686,495
683,535
50%
50%
Utah-02 Frances Farley (D) 
David S. Monson (R)*
$349,427
385,982
49%
49%
* indicates winner 
Total of all funds raised during the primary and general 
elections•
SOURCE: Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa,The Almanac of American
Politics, 1986, (Washington: The National Journal).
APPPENDIX C
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM USED TO SUMMARIZE 
ITEMIZED DISBURSEMENTS FROM FEC SCHEDULE B*
Account Disbursement Entries
Staff/Travel
Office
Advertising 
Direct Mail
TV & Radio
Newspaper
Outdoor
Undesignated
Includes: staff salaries, staff expenses, 
candidate expenses, phone bank payroll.
Includes: office rent, utilities, office 
supplies, office equipment, petty cash.
Includes: postage, printing, computer services, 
brochures, lists, address labels.
Includes: production costs, consulting fees, 
air time.
Includes: advertisement costs, subscriptions.
Includes: billboards, signs, buttons, bumper 
stickers, t-shirts, sweat shirts, book matches, 
shopping bags.
Includes: photographers, logo design, items
difficult to interpret.
Polling
Consultant
Other
Includes: consulting fees, research, targeting 
data, canvassing costs.
Includes: general and fundraising consulting 
services.
Includes: special events, candidate training, 
fees for guest speakers, filing fee, any mis­
cellaneous expenditures.
*Each campaign must submit a Schedule B to the FEC listing all 
expenditures each quarter and prior to and after each primary and 
general election.
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